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ABSTRACT 
Three experiments investigated a phenomenon of memory distortion. Social influence, in the form of 
bogus feedback information about the accuracy of an interpersonal judgment, dramatically distorted 
people's recollections. Participants in all three experiments watched a short video of a couple 
interacting. After the video was over, participants either judged which person had an affair or which 
person committed suicide (Experiment 1 only). After making their decision, participants were 
randomly assigned to hear bogus confirming ("Yes. that is the person who had the affair [committed 
suicide]") or discontinuing ("Actually, it was the other person who had the affair [committed 
suicide]") feedback. Participants in Experiment 1 (N = 98) who heard confirming feedback reported 
recalling more certainty in their decision, making their decision more easily, having a better basis for 
their decision, making their decision more quickly, being better at making judgments about others in 
general, and other distortions in recollection. This pattern of results was labeled the "post-decision 
feedback effect." Experiment 2 (N = 128) eliminated the possibility that the post-decision feedback 
effect is caused by participants' self-presentation concerns. Experiment 3 (N = 429) tested competing 
hypotheses for the post-decision feedback effect: anchoring and adjustment versus biased search of 
memory. Three variables were manipulated: post-decision feedback (Confirming vs. Disconfirming). 
completing dependent measures questionnaire under time pressure (Yes vs. No), and completing the 
dependent measures under cognitive load (Yes vs. No). The magnitude of the feedback effect was 
not changed by the resource constraint manipulations suggesting that the feedback effect is a highly 
automatic process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"There is no single public memory, no single script to explain the trauma of the past." 
Carolyn J. Mooney in The Chronicle of Higher Education on the legacy of Argentina's disappeared" 
Every week, in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aries, dozens of mothers march in front of 
government headquarters to protest the disappearance of their children during Argentina's 1976 
military coup. During the coup, thousands of people were arrested and detained, never to be heard 
from again. Recently, the government of Argentina has begun to prosecute those it can hold 
accountable for the disappearances. However, prosecution is difficult because much of the evidence 
used against the perpetrators of the disappearances is derived from people's memories. Reliance on 
human memory to sort out the events of the past is risky because human memory is an imperfect 
system: psychological research regularly demonstrates its susceptibility to a broad range of 
processing, recall, and recognition errors (e.g.. see Schacter. 1999). 
As in Argentina, shared memories often mean that the events of the past are subject to 
extensive public discourse. How does this public discourse affect memory? Does the presence of 
others affect recollections? Research indicates that the presence of others affects both attitudes and 
behavior (e.g.. see Cialdini. 2001: Cialdini & Trost. 1998): research also indicates that memories are 
easily distorted by a host of variables (e.g.. see Schacter, 1999). However, there is little research on 
how the behavior of others affects recollections. Three empirical studies presented here examine the 
role of social influence in producing dramatic distortions in recollections. Before describing the 
specific studies conducted, there is a brief review of the literature on social influence and memory 
distortion. Then, the connection between social influence and memory distortion is discussed with 
reference to extant literature. Finally, a research paradigm is discussed in which social influence 
dramatically distorts a broad range of people's recollections. 
2 
Social Influence 
There are two categories of social influence: social norms and conformity. Social norms are 
accepted standards of behavior that guide members of a society and vary across cultures (Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998). For example. American business cultures value competitiveness and independence: 
Native American cultures, in contrast, shun these traits (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). 
Conformity is defined as the movement from one's own position (on an attitude or behavior) to an 
alternate position because of pressure from others (Myers. 1999). There are two types of conformity: 
acceptance and compliance. Acceptance occurs when a person's attitude or behavior change is the 
result of a belief in the accuracy of the new attitude (or behavior). This type of conformity is 
typically the result of informational influence, which occurs because the target of the influence is 
explicitly seeking information about accuracy, rather than social approval (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). 
Compliance, the second type of conformity, occurs when outward behavior or attitude changes but 
only in response to an explicit request. This type of conformity is typically the result of normative 
influence, which occurs when people conform because of a desire for social approval, rather than a 
desire for accuracy (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). 
Both social norms and conformity have been investigated in the context of myriad behaviors. 
For example, participants who receive an unsolicited gift from a confederate are more willing to 
subsequently purchase a raffle ticket from the confederate than are participants who received no gift, 
perpetuating the social norm of reciprocity (Regan, 1971). Asch's seminal studies on conformity 
demonstrated that people's judgments can be altered by the behavior of others: people readily made 
errors in perceptual judgments (i.e.. comparing the length of stimulus lines to one another) after 
hearing other people make errors (Asch. 1955). Stanley Milgram (1974) dramatically illustrated that 
people can be induced to administer severe electric shocks to fellow research participants (who are 
actually confederates of the experimenter), prompted only by rather innocuous comments from an 
experimenter (e.g.. "The experiment must continue."). The fact that human behavior can be easily 
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altered by the presence of others is also demonstrated by recent research indicating that another 
person can influence the choice that an eyewitness makes when attempting to identify a criminal 
suspect; an eyewitness is more likely to identify the suspect when the identification task is 
administered by someone who knows the identify of the suspect (Phillips, McAuliff, Kovera, & 
Cutler, 1999). 
Most research on social influence concerns how the presence of others affects attitudes (e.g., 
toward illegal drug use. Gutierres & Van Puymbroeck. 2001) or behavior (e.g., purchasing decisions, 
Pietras, 2001 ). Little research has been conducted to assess whether the presence of others affects 
recollections. This is an important area of investigation because memories are rarely produced in 
isolation. Memories are not only produced in the presence of others, they are often the product of 
input from others. Before discussing the effect of social influence variables on memory distortion, a 
brief review of the literature on memory distortion is presented. 
Memory Distortion 
As early as 1885. experimental psychologists systematically investigated the nature of human 
memory (Ebbinghaus. 1885/1964). Those investigations inevitably turned to examinations of 
common errors in memory. As with social influence, memory distortions have been investigated in 
many contexts. Many of these investigations have originated within the interface of psychology and 
law because accurate recall is crucial for effectively prosecuting criminal cases. For example, 
Elizabeth Loftus and colleagues (e.g.. Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Loftus & Palmer, 1974) have 
produced an extensive program of research demonstrating that misleading questions can influence 
people's recollections of a witnessed event. In that research, questions making reference to the 
presence of a yield sign at an intersection caused participants to report seeing a yield sign, even 
though none was present (Loftus et al.. 1978). Eyewitness accounts are not the only forensically-
relevant judgments affected by distortions in memory. Research indicates that criminal suspects can 
be induced to confess to crimes they did not commit (Kassin. 1997). In one especially dramatic case. 
4 
a suspect was even induced to recall specific details about an entirely fabricated event (Wright, 1994). 
Research also demonstrates that people can be induced to remember events that occurred shortly after 
birth even though there is almost no scientific evidence to suggest that people have memories for that 
period of childhood (Loftus. 1993: Terrance, Matheson, Allard, & Schnarr, 2000). In general, it is 
relatively easy to induce memories for events that did not occur (e.g., Loftus, 1997; Porter, Birt, 
Yuille. & Lehman. 2000). 
The research on memory distortions is extensive enough to warrant a comprehensive review 
by Schacter entitled "The seven sins of memory" outlining seven categories of errors committed by 
the human memory system (Schacter. 1999). One of the seven sins is bias, defined as "...the 
distorting influences of present knowledge, beliefs, and feelings on recollection of previous 
experiences." (Schacter. 1999. p. 193). Surprisingly, there is little research on the bias sin. Schacter's 
review of the relevant literature was brief, encompassing only four broad research domains. First, he 
cited studies on bias caused by people's desire to maintain consistency between current feelings and 
recollections of past feelings (e.g.. Marcus. 1986; Scharfe & Bartholomew, 1998). Second, he noted 
studies in which bias was caused by people's beliefs about whether their attitudes had changed over 
time (e.g.. Ross, 1989). Beliefs about attitude stability, in turn, are affected by the context in which 
the attitude exists (Cue & Hirst. 2001). Third, a study demonstrating that bias distorts specific, as well 
as general, recollections of the past was discussed (Spiro. 1980). Finally, Schacter (1999) noted that 
past experiences can bias subsequent social judgments (e.g., Banaji & Greenwald, 1995). 
Other research is relevant to the notion that current knowledge biases recollections of the 
past. Snyder and Uranowitz (1978) examined the effects of category labels on people's recall of a 
narrative description. Participants read a description of the life of "Betty K." Sometime after reading 
the description, participants learned that Betty K. was living either a heterosexual or a lesbian 
lifestyle. Participants who learned that Betty FC. was living a lesbian lifestyle mistakenly recalled 
"facts" from the narrative that were consistent with a lesbian lifestyle (e.g.. that Betty never went out 
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with men). Snyder and Uranowitz (1978) concluded that the category labels given to participants 
biased their recall of the narrative description of Betty K.'s life. 
The Role of Social Influence in Memory Distortions 
An early memory researcher wrote: "If we wish to know whether a man remembers anything, 
we ask him: and we generally take his word for it..." (Bartlett. 1932, p. 296). Our view of memory is 
not nearly so generous now. As the research on memory distortion indicates, errors in memory are 
common. One of the causes of such distortions is the presence of others. Existing research on the 
role of social influence in memory distortion focuses primarily on the effect of social influence on 
accuracy. For example. Bless and Strack (1998) note that people are most easily influenced by 
informational social influence when their memories are unclear: when people know that information 
is inaccessible in their own memory, they look to the environment to provide them with cues as to the 
"correct" response. This is consistent with research indicating that when participants are presented 
with misleading information embedded in questions, they make recognition errors consistent with the 
misleading information. However, when participants are informed that they were presented with 
misleading information, before taking the recognition test, they make no more errors than do 
participants in a control group (who received no misleading information, Highouse & Bottrill. 1995). 
The bulk of the research on social influence and memory distortion comes from the literature 
on eyewitness identifications. In this research, the primary dependent measure was not the accuracy 
of participants' memory. Rather, it was the set of recollections associated with an identification 
decision (e.g.. the certainty the witness reported having in his or her identification at the time it was 
made). In research by Wells and Bradfield (1998). participants watched a security camera video and 
were instructed to pay close attention to a particular man who walked by the view of the camera. 
After the tape was over, participants learned that the man shot and killed a security guard outside the 
store shortly after the video was made. Participants then attempted an identification of the gunman 
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from a five-person photospread.1 All identifications were mistaken because the gunman's photo was 
not included in the photospread. After making an identification, participants were randomly assigned 
to hear one of three types of feedback information. Some participants were given confirming 
feedback (i.e.. "Good, you identified the suspect."), others were given discontinuing feedback (i.e.. "I 
see you identified number . The actual suspect was number ."), and still others were given no 
information about the accuracy of their identification. Participants then completed a questionnaire 
that included questions about their witnessed experience, the process of making an identification, and 
their general ability to recognize faces (see Appendix A). 
Because participants were randomly assigned to conditions and the manipulation occurred 
after the identification, they should have had equivalent levels of confidence, an equivalent view, 
equivalent ability to make out details of the gunman's face, and so on. Therefore, any differences 
observed in participants' reports are due to the feedback manipulation rather than pre-feedback 
differences among groups. Post-identification feedback information significantly influenced 
participants' responses to three types of questions. First, confirming feedback inflated reports about 
the event (e.g.. the security camera video). Second, confirming feedback inflated reports about the 
decision-making process (e.g.. how quickly the identification was made). Third, confirming feedback 
inflated reports about general abilities (e.g.. ability to recognize strangers). It is important to note that 
feedback distorted reports of events that preceded the manipulation (e.g., "At the time you identified 
the suspect, how certain were you in the accuracy of your identification?"). The distortions produced 
in eyewitnesses' recollections demonstrated by Wells and Bradfield ( 1998) fall under Schacter's 
(1999) bias sin." 
This effect has been broadly classified as "memory distortion." The particular type of 
memory under consideration here is the memory for internal states related to prior experiences (e.g.. 
1 All participants who were shown the photospread made an identification. 
2 Schacter ( 1999) actually classified the post-identification feedback effect as a sin of suggestibility. He later 
acknowledged that it was more appropriately classified as bias. 
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"At the time you identified the suspect, how certain were you that you chose the correct person?"). It 
is unclear which of two types of memory processes cause the post-identification feedback effect. The 
first process, based on the concept of memory traces, assumes that a memory trace of some sort is 
created during the experiment. For example, while making an identification, participants would 
spontaneously create a memory trace for how certain they are about their identification. Under this 
assumed process, distortions in participants' reports occur because feedback affects the existing 
memory trace or how the trace is retrieved. The second possibility for how feedback distorts reported 
recollections, the heuristic-reconstruction process, does not assume that a memory trace exists before 
the dependent measures questionnaire is administered. Instead, it argues that participants' reports are 
derived from a reconstructive process through the use of heuristics that is not initiated until the 
dependent measures questionnaire is presented. Therefore, participants' reports are distorted because 
the feedback affects this reconstructive process somehow, rather than affecting an existing memory 
trace or the manner in which the trace is retrieved. The phrase "distortions in memory," as used here, 
refers to the observed distortions in participants' reports of a prior experience. Experiment 3 was 
designed to address whether the post-decision feedback effect operates through a heuristic-
reconstruction process or through a memory-trace process. 
The Feedback Effect 
The focus of the current research is on the type of memory distortion demonstrated by Wells 
and Bradfield (1998) in which a casual comment from a lineup administrator produced broad 
distortions in participants' reports of the past. This pattern of retrospective distortions was labeled the 
feedback effect. In order to explore the specific characteristics of the feedback effect, three 
experiments were conducted. The first experiment establishes the generalizability of the post-
identification feedback effect into a post -decision feedback effect; participants made a social 
judgment rather than an identification decision. The second experiment eliminates the possibility that 
participants' responses are driven by self-presentation motivations. The third experiment tests two 
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competing hypotheses for the post-decision feedback effect: anchoring and adjustment versus biased 
search of memory. Two resource constraint manipulations were introduced: time pressure and 
cognitive load. Results indicate that resource constraint manipulations did not affect the magnitude of 
the post-decision feedback effect. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
The current work deals with the feedback effect described above: A casual comment from an 
experimenter dramatically distorts people's retrospective judgments. Prior to the current work, the 
feedback effect had been demonstrated only with an eyewitness identification task. This first 
experiment was designed to see if the post-identification feedback effect would generalize to an 
interpersonal judgment situation. The eyewitness paradigm involves three phases. In the first phase, 
participants observe an event (witness phase) and make a decision about that event (i.e.. an 
identification). In the second phase, participants are randomly assigned to hear feedback about the 
accuracy of their decision. In the third phase, participants answer questions about the witnessed event 
and the processes involved in their decision. 
An interpersonal judgment paradigm was created to parallel the eyewitness paradigm. Like 
the eyewitness paradigm, in the interpersonal judgment paradigm, participants first viewed an event 
(a videotape of a couple at a counseling session) and then made a decision about that event (i.e.. 
which person committed suicide or had an affair). In the second phase, participants were randomly 
assigned to hear feedback about the accuracy of their decision. In the third phase, participants 
answered questions about the event and the processes involved in their decision. Like the eyewitness 
paradigm, there was enough ambiguity in the event to ensure that both confirming and discontinuing 
feedback were credible, regardless of which person the participants selected. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants (N = 98: 64 female) were undergraduate psychology students at Iowa State 
University. They were given extra credit in their psychology classes in exchange for their 
participation. Participants watched a video in which a couple was interacting. After watching the 
video, participants were instructed to make one of two decisions. Through random assignment, half 
of the participants heard that one member of the couple committed suicide shortly after the tape was 
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made; they were instructed to indicate which person they thought committed suicide. The other half 
of the participants heard that one member of the couple had an affair shortly after the tape was made. 
Participants indicated which person they thought had an affair. After making their decision, all 
participants were randomly assigned to hear confirming or discontinuing feedback about the accuracy 
of their decision. The resulting design was a 2 (Suicide Scenario vs. Affair Scenario) x 2 (Confirming 
Feedback vs. Discontinuing Feedback) fully randomized, between-participants factorial. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants watched a 6 min video in which a man and a woman were interacting. 
Participants believed that the video contained excerpts from a counseling session that the couple 
attended. The cover story indicated that participants should pay close attention to the conversation in 
anticipation of answering some questions about the couple's relationship. After the video was over, 
participants were told that one member of the couple had an affair or committed suicide. Participants 
then indicated which person they thought had the affair or committed suicide. After making their 
decision, participants were randomly assigned to hear confirming feedback (i.e., "You're right. That 
is the person who had the affair [committed suicide].") or discontinuing feedback (i.e., "Actually, it 
was the other person who had the affair [committed suicide]."). 
A short time after hearing feedback, participants completed a two-page questionnaire (see 
Table 1 ). Recall that the dependent measures in the eyewitness paradigm could be divided into three 
categories: questions about the event (e.g., the security camera video), questions about the decision­
making process (e.g.. how quickly an identification was made), and questions about general abilities 
(e.g.. ability to recognize strangers, see Appendix A). Parallel dependent measures were created for 
the interpersonal judgment paradigm. Participants answered questions about the event (e.g.. "How 
much attention were you paying to the conversation the two people in the video were having?"), the 
decision-making process (e.g.. "How easy or difficult was it for you to decide which person had the 
affair [committed suicide]?"), and their general abilities (e.g.. "In general, how good are you at 
Il 
Table I. Dependent measures for Experiment 1 
At the time you decided which person had an affair, how certain were you that you chose the 
correct person? 
0% 10% 20% 
not at all 
30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
totally 
certain certain 
How much attention were you paying to the conversation the two people in the video were having? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 1 
none 
9 10 
my total 
attention 
At the time you decided which person had an affair, to what extent did you feel that you had a good 
basis (enough information) to make your decision? 
0 1 
no basis 
at all 
8 ' 10 
a very 
good basis 
At the time you watched the video, how involved did you think the woman was in the relationship? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
not at all 
10 
totally 
involved involved 
At the time you watched the video, how involved did you think the man was in the relationship? 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
not at all 
involved 
How easy or difficult was it for you to decide which person had an affair? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
extremely 
easv 
How long did it take you to decide which person had an affair? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
It took almost 
no time 
10 
totally 
involved 
9 10 
extremely 
difficult 
9 10 
It took a 
long time 
12 
Table 1. (continued) 
In general, how good are you at making judgments about other people? 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
very poor excellent 
In general, how good are you at interpreting non-verbal behaviors? 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8  9  1 0  
very poor excellent 
Which statement describes your decision process? Choose one. 
a) As soon as the experimenter told me that one of the people had an affair. I knew exactly who 
it was. 
b) I had to think back about the conversation and reconstruct it before I could decide 
which person had an affair. 
Indicate the extent to which the following statement describes your thoughts: 
"While I was watching the people's conversation on the videotape, I had a suspicion that one of them 
might have had an affair." 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
This statement does This statement 
not describe mv describes mv 
thoughts at all thoughts 
extremely well 
Note. See Appendix B for dependent measures for suicide scenario. 
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interpreting non-verbal behaviors?"). Questions were answered on an 11-point Likert scale. After 
completing the dependent measures questionnaire, participants were thanked for their participation, 
debriefed, and dismissed (see Appendix C for debriefing). 
Results 
All participants made a choice about which member of the couple committed suicide or had 
an affair. Thirty-three participants (61.1%) in the suicide scenario condition believed that it was the 
man who committed suicide. 26 participants (59.1%) in the affair scenario condition believed that it 
was the man who had an affair. A series of univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) was 
conducted to evaluate the effect of feedback on participants' reports. The correlations among the 
dependent measures are relatively low. suggesting that each question is measuring a somewhat 
different aspect of participants' experience (see Table 2 for pooled correlations among dependent 
measures across all three experiments). Therefore, the effect of the independent variables was 
analyzed on each dependent measure independently. First, analyses were conducted to test for any 
differences between the suicide and affair scenarios. 
The Scenario Variable 
In order to determine whether participants responded to the affair and suicide scenarios 
differently, two-way (Feedback x Scenario) ANOVAs were conducted on the dependent measures. 
No main effects for the scenario variable were significant, all Fs( 1, 96) < 3.29, ps > .07. The best 
means of determining whether the scenario variable affected participants' reports is to test the two-
way (Feedback x Scenario) interactions. A significant interaction could indicate that the effect of 
feedback is consistently different across the suicide versus affair scenario conditions. Three 
Feedback x Scenario interactions were significant: participants' reports of how certain they recalled 
being when they made their decision, how much attention they reported paying to the conversation, 
and how good they reported being at making judgments about other people, all Fs(l, 97) > 3.95, gs < 
.05. No other interactions were significant, all Fs(l. 97) < 1.45. gs > .23. 
Table 2. Pooled correlations among dependent measures across all three experiments 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Certain .15 .61 -.54 -.42 .27 .19 .14 .06 .02 .03 .03 .01 .10 .01 .24 
n = 658 
2. Attention .13 -.07 -.06 .15 .15 .19 .05 .05 .20 .00 .10 .10 -.04 .00 
n = 659 
3. Basis -.48 -.22 .27 .14 .15 .08 .06 .02 .03 .04 .07 .05 .20 
n = 652 
4. Ease .55 -.21 -.10 -.04 -.01 .05 -.01 -.06 -.03 -.09 .06 -.18 
n = 656 
5. Length -.13 -.06 .00 .03 .02 -.03 -.06 .03 -.09 .12 -.10 
n = 658 
6. Judgments .60 .41 .09 .11 .12 .01 .08 .11 -.09 .13 
n = 658 
7. Non-verbals .50 .07 .11 .13 .10 .15 .12 -.01 .12 
n = 659 
8. Voice .07 .13 .23 .09 .17 .02 -.04 .11 
n = 561 
9. Hostile .35 .37 .06 .09 .03 .05 .03 
n = 560 
10. Anxiety .28 -.01 .14 -.01 .06 .14 
n = 558 
1 1 .  F r u s t r a t e  . 2 0  . 1 0  . 1 1  . 0 4  . 0 5  
n = 560 
12. Supportive .13 .31 .03 .01 
n = 559 
13. Negative .17 .06 .15 
n = 548 
14. Positive .04 .02 
n = 551 
15. Influence .12 
n = 538 
16. Suspicious 
n = 653 
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The form of the three significant interactions was not consistent. First, the significant 
interaction on participants' reports of certainty revealed that in the suicide scenario condition, 
confirming feedback significantly inflated participants' reports, compared to discontinuing feedback 
(M = 72.69. SD = 23.08 and M = 53.92, SD = 17.91, respectively), t(52) = 3.35, g < .01. In the affair 
scenario condition, confirming feedback also significantly inflated participants' reports of 
retrospective certainty compared to discontinuing feedback (M = 73.42, SD = 12.92 and M = 38.00, 
SD = 24.66, respectively), t(42) = 5.69. g < .01. However, the simple main effect of feedback was 
larger in the affair scenario condition than in the suicide scenario condition (d = 1.32 versus d = 0.84. 
respectively). 
Second, the significant interaction on participants' reports of the amount of attention they 
paid to the couple revealed that confirming feedback inflated participants' reports in the suicide 
scenario condition but not in the affair scenario condition. In the suicide scenario condition, 
confirming feedback significantly inflated participants' reports of attention compared to 
disconfirming feedback (M = 9.19. SD = 0.85 and M = 8.32. SD = 1.94, respectively), t(52) = 2.10, g 
= .04. In the affair scenario condition, the effect of confirming versus disconfirming feedback on 
participants' reports of attention was not significant (M = 8.16. SD = 1.64 and M = 8.68, SD =1.11, 
respectively). t(42) = 1.26. g = .22. 
Finally, participants' reports of their general ability to make judgments of others were 
inflated by confirming feedback in the affair scenario condition but not in the suicide scenario 
condition. In the affair scenario condition, confirming feedback significantly inflated participants' 
reports of judgments of others compared to disconfirming feedback (M = 7.63, SD =1.01 and M = 
5.72, SD = 1.51, respectively). t(42) = 4.75. g < .01. In the suicide scenario condition, the effect of 
confirming versus disconfirming feedback was not significant (M = 6.88, SD = 1.45 and M = 6.39, 
SD = 1.57. respectively). t(52) = 1.19. g = .24. 
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These interactions revealed that, compared to the suicide scenario, the affair scenario 
produced stronger effects of the feedback variable for participants' reports of retrospective certainty 
and judgments of others. In contrast, for participants' reports of attention, the suicide scenario 
produced a stronger effect of the feedback variable than did the affair scenario. However, only three 
Feedback x Scenario interactions were significant and in all cases, confirming feedback inflated 
participants' reports, compared to disconfirming feedback. Therefore, the suicide and affair scenarios 
had similar effects on most of the dependent measures so results are collapsed across the scenario 
variable for the following analyses. 
The Feedback Variable 
In order to evaluate the effect of feedback on participants' reports, one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted on each of the dependent measures. Feedback had a broad effect on participants' reports. 
Compared to participants who heard disconfirming feedback, those who heard confirming feedback 
reported recalling greater confidence in their decision, having a better basis for their decision, making 
their decision more easily, making their decision more quickly, being better at making judgments 
about others, and being better at interpreting non-verbal behaviors, all Fs(l, 96) > 7.40, gs < .01 (see 
Table 3 for all means, standard deviations, and effect size estimates). Feedback did not affect 
participants' reports of how much attention they paid to the couple's conversation or how suspicious 
they were about one member of the couple having an affair, F( 1. 96) = 0.57, g = .38 and F( 1, 96) = 
0.47, g = .50. respectively. 
Feedback also affected participants' reports of how quickly they made their decision. A test 
for the equality of proportions revealed that participants who received confirming feedback were 
more likely to report that their decision was immediate than were participants who received 
disconfirming feedback (38% versus 11%), z = 3.05. g < .05. 
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Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and effect sizes for dependent measures in Experiment 1 
Dependent measures 
Condition 
Confirming 
Feedback 
Certainty 
73.00 
(19.26) 
Attention 
8.76 
(1.33) 
Basis 
6.77 
(1.88) 
Ease 
3.60 
(2.48) 
Long 
2.53 
(1.79 
) 
4.26 
(2.19 
) 
.00 
Judgments 
7.20 
(1.32) 
Non-
verbals 
7.04 
(1.35) 
Suspicious 
2.04 
(2.23) 
Disconfirming 
Feedback 
46.41 
(22.63) 
8.49 
(1.60) 
4.68 
(3.59) 
6.91 
(1.95) 
6.07 
(1.57) 
6.26 
(1.47) 
1.74 
(2.24 
Q .00 .38 .00 .00 .00 .01 .50 
1.07 0.18 0.67 1.20 0.79 0.72 0.53 0.14 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
3 Measure of effect size, the difference between means in standard deviation units (Cohen, 1988). 
Discussion 
The results of this study were dramatic. Recall that the dependent measures required 
participants to report on events that occurred before feedback was administered. Because participants 
were randomly assigned to condition, their reports on the dependent measures questionnaire should 
have been equivalent across conditions. Instead, feedback distorted participants' recollections of pre-
feedback judgments. Because the feedback manipulation did not occur until after participants' 
decisions were made, the observed differences are due to the feedback manipulation rather than to 
any pre-feedback differences across conditions. 
Overall, feedback had a broad effect on participants' reports, introducing bias into three 
distinct areas of participants' reports. First, it distorted reports of the event; confirming feedback 
caused participants to report having a better basis for their decision, compared to disconfirming 
feedback. Second, feedback distorted reports of the process of making a decision. Participants who 
received confirming feedback reported recalling greater confidence in their decision at the time it was 
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made and reported that their decision took less time than did participants who received disconfirming 
feedback. Finally, feedback affected participants' reports about their general abilities. Participants 
who received confirming feedback reported a better ability to interpret non-verbal behavior than did 
participants who received disconfirming feedback. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated an important phenomenon: Bogus feedback information distorts 
people's reports of the past. How does this effect work? At first, the hindsight bias, or knew-it-all-
along effect, seems an apt description of how participants react to feedback. The hindsight bias has 
been shown to cause people to distort their estimation of what they would have thought about the 
probability of an outcome, had they not known the actual outcome (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975a; 1977: 
Fischhoff & Bevth. 1975). Consider participants' reports of recalled certainty: People who are told 
that their decision was correct recall being more confident than they actually were. The hindsight 
bias can explain the effect of feedback on participants' recollections of certainty fairly well; outcome 
information causes participants to believe that they knew their answer was the correct answer all 
along. However, the effect of feedback on other dependent measures is not so easily explained by the 
hindsight bias. For example, why does confirming feedback cause people to recall having a better 
basis for their decision than they actually had? Why does confirming feedback cause people to report 
being better at judging non-verbal behaviors? The tendency to overestimate prior knowledge of an 
outcome should not affect these dependent measures. In addition to the difficulty the hindsight bias 
has in explaining the effects of confirming feedback on some dependent measures, there is nothing in 
hindsight bias research analogous to the disconfirming feedback condition in the post-decision 
feedback paradigm. 
Another important difference between the post-decision feedback effect and the hindsight 
bias further complicates descriptions of the post-decision feedback effect as an example of the 
hindsight bias: the post-decision feedback effect captures judgments about actual events whereas the 
hindsight bias does not. In the typical hindsight paradigm, people make a judgment about a 
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hypothetical past situation (i.e., "How would you have responded, had you not been told the 
answer?"); it is these judgments that are biased. In contrast, participants in the post-decision feedback 
paradigm report on events that actually occurred (e.g., "How long did it take you to decide which 
person had the affair?"); it is these recollections that are distorted by bogus feedback. Because the 
hindsight bias does not refer to memory distortion, it cannot explain the post-decision feedback 
effect.3 Therefore, it is necessary to look beyond the hindsight bias to understand the post-decision 
feedback effect. 
One explanation for the results of Experiment 1 is based on the notion that people are 
motivated to promote positive public images. In the context of this experiment, they are specifically 
motivated to present themselves as skilled decision makers. The argument that people are motivated 
to present favorable images of themselves is common. Research on impression management (e.g.. 
Schlenker & Weigold, 1992). self-monitoring (e.g., Snyder. 1987), and self-handicapping (e.g., 
Berglas & Jones. 1978) supports the notion that people are often guided by a desire to create positive 
impressions in the eyes of others. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that participants in the post-
decision feedback paradigm respond to the dependent measures questionnaire with an eye toward 
ensuring that others regard them as skilled decision makers. However, two characteristics of the 
obtained data make it difficult to automatically endorse a self-presentation explanation for the post-
decision feedback effect. 
First, if participants are interested in making themselves look good, as self-presentation 
argues, a pattern of data other than that typically observed in post-decision feedback studies should be 
obtained. For example, participants could enhance their image as a decision-maker through 
exploitation of a principle of attribution known as augmentation (Kelley. 1973). Kelley's (1973) 
J Research on memory and the hindsight bias does exist (e.g., Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). That 
research examines how feedback distorts memories for explicit probabilistic judgments (e.g., How much 
saturated fat was in a piece of pie?). In the post-decision feedback paradigm, memory distortion occurs, in part, 
because judgments did not exist before feedback was administered. 
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augmentation principle states that people make internal attributions for success when a successful 
outcome is achieved in the presence of external barriers. Self-handicapping, the practice of creating 
barriers to success in order to prevent an internal attribution for failure, is a perfect example of a 
phenomenon in which the augmentation principle can be exploited (Berglas & Jones, 1978). Once 
barriers are in place, self-handicappers have a convenient explanation for failure. However, if the 
self-handicapper happens to succeed, internal attributions for success are stronger than they would be 
had the external barriers not been in place (see Crocker and Major, 1989, for another context in which 
the augmentation principle can be exploited). 
Participants in the typical post-decision feedback experiment do not show evidence of using 
the augmentation principle. In order to do so, participants would emphasize the external barriers to 
success (e.g.. the lack of information on which to base a decision) when answering the dependent 
measures. For example, participants who receive confirming feedback could reason: "I made the 
right choice in spite of the fact that there wasn't much information on which to base my decision." 
Such a pattern of responses would ensure that the participant looks like a skilled decision-maker: A 
correct choice was made in spite of external barriers to success. However, instead of exploiting the 
augmentation principle, participants in the confirming feedback condition acknowledge external 
variables that facilitated their ability to make a correct decision. 
Self-presentation explanations for the post-decision feedback effect do not fit existing data 
for a second reason. In the eyewitness paradigm, when participants privately think about elements of 
their witnessing experience and identification decision before hearing feedback (i.e., a prior-thought 
manipulation), they are not as affected by subsequent feedback information as are participants who 
engage in a filler task and then hear feedback (Wells & Bradfield, 1999). These data are inconsistent 
with a self-presentation explanation of the feedback effect. Why should private, prior thought 
diminish the strength of the feedback effect? Participants should not be any less concerned with self-
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presentation simply because they have had time to think about their witnessed experience and 
identification decision. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 introduced a manipulation based on the "prior-thought" manipulation used in 
Wells and Bradfield (1999). In the current study, participants were randomly assigned to see some of 
the questions to be asked in the dependent measures (i.e., the "question-knowledge" manipulation), 
prior to receiving feedback. As in Wells and Bradfield (1999), participants were not asked to publicly 
indicate an answer to any question. Instead, they were directed to think privately about how they 
would answer the questions and instructed that they would have an opportunity to answer them 
shortly. If self-presentation is driving the post-decision feedback effect, a manipulation that alerts 
participants to the questions to be asked should not diminish the strength of the effect. If anything, 
such a manipulation might actually enhance the feedback effect rather than diminish it because 
alerting participants to the very questions to be answered would give them ample opportunity to 
arrive at a response that maximizes their self-presentation goal. Thus, this manipulation is a fair test 
of whether self-presentation is a viable explanation for the post-decision feedback effect. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 128 undergraduate students at Iowa State University (96 female). They 
were given extra credit in their psychology classes in exchange for their participation. Participants 
were randomly assigned to view (or not view) some of the dependent measures before feedback was 
administered (the question-knowledge manipulation). In addition, participants were randomly 
assigned to hear confirming or disconfirming feedback about the accuracy of an interpersonal 
judgment they made. The resulting design was a 2 (Confirming Feedback vs. Disconfirming 
Feedback) x 2 (Question-knowledge vs. No Question-knowledge) fully randomized, between-
participants factorial. 
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Materials and Procedure 
Participants in Experiment 2 were tested with the affair scenario materials used in the 
interpersonal judgment paradigm described in Experiment 1. After watching the video in which a 
couple is interacting, participants made a decision about which member of the couple had an affair.4 
Then, participants were randomly assigned to question-knowledge or no question-knowledge 
condition. Participants in the former condition received a sheet on which four of the dependent 
measures questions were listed (see Appendix D). They were instructed to think privately about how 
they would answer those questions. Participants in the no question-knowledge condition did not 
receive any information about the questions to be asked in the dependent measures questionnaire. 
After 4 min passed, participants were randomly assigned to receive confirming feedback (i.e., "I 
wanted to let you know that I noticed that you were right in your choice of which person had the 
affair.") or disconfirming feedback (i.e., "I wanted to let you know that I noticed that the person you 
chose was actually not the one who had the affair. It was the other person who had an affair."). Two 
min after hearing feedback, participants completed a dependent measures questionnaire. The same 
questions used in Experiment I were used in Experiment 2 with one exception: eight questions were 
added (see Table 4 for questions new to Experiment 2). These dependent measures were added to 
further explore the extent of post-decision feedback's influence on retrospective judgments about an 
interpersonal task. After completing the dependent measures questionnaire, participants were thanked 
for their participation, debriefed, and dismissed (see Appendix E for debriefing). 
Results 
In order to determine whether the question-knowledge manipulation moderated the effect of 
post-decision feedback, a series of univariate two-way ANOVAs was conducted on the dependent 
measures. A significant Feedback x Question-knowledge interaction in which the question-
4 Recall that the suicide and affair scenarios had very similar effects on participants' reports. Therefore, only 
the affair scenario is used in this and subsequent experiments in order to reduce the possibility that a participant 
would become upset by having to make a judgment about which person committed suicide. 
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Table 4. Dependent measures added in Experiment 2 
In general, how good are you at detecting variations in people's tone of voice? 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
very poor excellent 
At the time you were watching the video, to what degree did you notice hostility in the couple's 
conversation? 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
I didn't I noticed 
notice any intense 
hostility hostility 
o At the time you were watching the video, to what degree did you notice that the couple was anxious? 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
I didn't I noticed 
notice any intense 
anxiety anxiety 
At the time you were watching the video, to what extent did you notice that either member of the 
couple was frustrated? 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
I didn't I noticed 
notice intense 
anv frustration frustration 
To what extent did you notice supportive comments from either member of the couple? 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
I noticed I didn't 
a lot of notice 
supportive anv supportive 
comments comments 
Think for a moment about the member of the couple who had the affair. 
To what extent can you recall that person making negative comments about the relationship 
or their partner? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
I can't recall I can recall 
very many a lot of 
negative comments negative comments 
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Table 4. (continued) 
To what extent can you recall that person making positive comments about the relationship 
or their partner? 
1 2 
I can recall 
a lot of 
positive comments 
3 8 9 10 
I can't recall 
very many 
positive comments 
To what extent do you think the information you received about the accuracy of your judgment 
affected your answers to any of the questions you have just answered? 
0 1 
It didn't 
affect my 
answers 
to any of the 
questions 
8 9 10 
It affected 
my answers 
to all of the 
questions 
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knowledge manipulation reduces the magnitude of the feedback effect indicates that self-presentation 
is not a viable explanation for the post-decision feedback effect. As noted in Experiment 1, the 
correlations among the dependent measures are low, indicating that each measure is capturing a 
different aspect of participants' experience (see Table 2 for pooled correlations among the dependent 
measures across all three experiments). The results are described in the following order: main effects 
of the feedback variable, main effects of the question-knowledge variable, and Feedback x Question-
knowledge interactions. 
The Feedback Variable 
The two-way Feedback x Question-knowledge ANOVAs revealed significant main effects of 
feedback on five dependent measures. Compared to participants who heard disconfirming feedback, 
those who heard confirming feedback reported having a greater basis on which to make their 
decision, making their decision more quickly, being better at making judgments about other people, 
being better at detecting variations in other people's tone of voice, and noticing fewer supportive 
comments from either member of the couple, all Fs(l. 127) > 4.18, ps < .04 (see Table 5 for means). 
Feedback had a marginally significant effect on two other dependent measures. Compared to 
participants who heard disconfirming feedback, those who heard confirming feedback reported 
recalling greater certainty at the time of their decision and making their decision more easily, Fs( 1, 
127) > 2.93, gs < .09. No other main effects for feedback were significant, all Fs(l, 127) < 1.47, gs > 
.23. 
Although the main effect for feedback on participants' recalled certainty was only marginally 
significant, confirming feedback significantly inflated participants' reports in the no question-
knowledge condition. Participants who heard confirming feedback reported recalling greater certainty 
than did participants who heard disconfirming feedback (M = 63.06, SD = 25.84 and M = 46.90, SD 
= 23.01. respectively). F( 1. 63) = 6.92, g < .01, replicating the effects of feedback from Experiment 1 
in which feedback affected retrospective certainty in the absence of other experimental manipulations. 
Table 5. Means, standard deviations, and effect sizes for dependent measures in Experiment 2 
Main effect of Main effect of 
No Question-knowledge Question-knowledge Feedback Question-knowledge Interaction 
Dependent Disconfirming Confirming Disconfirming Confirming 
measures Feedback Feedback Feedback Feedback F P d° F P d" F P d' MSE 
Certainty 46.90 
(23.01) 
n = 29 
63.06 
(25.84) 
n = 36 
55.15 
(17.87) 
n = 33 
52.65 
(26.21) 
n = 34 
3.15 .08 0.28 0.14 .71 0.08 5.69 .02 0.78 550.76 
Attention 8.79 
(1.29) 
n = 29 
9.03 
(1.18) 
n = 36 
8.52 
(1.64) 
n = 33 
8.65 
(1.39) 
n = 34 
0.90 .35 0.14 2.43 .12 0.24 0.16 .69 0.08 1.86 
Basis 4.79 
(2.02) 
n = 29 
5.86 
(2.57) 
n = 36 
4.18 
(1.63) 
n = 33 
5.26 
(2.56) 
n = 34 
7.58 .00 0.48 2.43 .12 0.28 0.00 .99 0.00 5.06 
Ease 5.86 
(2.00) 
n = 29 
4.81 
(2.73) 
n = 36 
5.97 
(2.11) 
n = 33 
5.56 
(2.74) 
n = 34 
2.93 .09 0.30 1.02 .32 0.20 0.57 .45 0.26 6.02 
Long 4.72 
(2.49) 
n = 29 
2.92 
(1.90) 
n = 36 
3.94 
(2.47) 
n = 33 
3.32 
(2.11) 
n = 34 
9.70 .00 0.52 0.19 .66 0.04 2.41 .12 0.51 5.06 
Judgments 5.97 
(1.92) 
n = 29 
6.75 
(1.61) 
n = 36 
5.86 
(1.76) 
n = 33 
6.65 
(1.95) 
n = 34 
7.60 .00 0.43 0.30 .58 0.08 0.05 .83 0.00 3.11 
Non- 6.21 6.69 6.67 6.59 0.56 .46 0.11 0.25 .62 0.09 1.01 .32 0.32 3.03 
verbals (1.54) 
n = 29 
(1.75) 
n = 36 
(171) 
n = 33 
(1.91) 
n = 34 
Voice 6.38 
(1.78) 
n = 29 
7.53 
(1.18) 
n = 36 
6.97 
(1.59) 
n = 33 
7.00 
(2.02) 
n = 34 
4.18 .04 0.34 0.01 .94 0.02 3.77 .05 0.66 2.78 
Hostile 6.21 
(2.53) 
n = 29 
6.42 
(2.03) 
n = 36 
6.30 
(1.93) 
n = 33 
6.35 
(2.03) 
n = 34 
0.16 .69 0.06 0.00 .99 0.00 0.07 .79 0.26 4.54 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
' Effect size estimate. Measure of the difference between means in standard deviation units. 
Table 5. (continued) 
No Question-knowledge Question-knowledge 
Main effect of Main effect of 
Feedback Question-knowledge Interaction 
Dependent Disconfirming Confirming Disconfirming Confirming 
measures Feedback Feedback Feedback Feedback 
Anxious 5.48 5.61 5.39 5.79 
(2.31) (2.18) (1.87) (2.21) 
n = 29 n = 36 n = 33 n = 34 
Frustrated 8.28 7.81 8.00 7.68 
(1.19) (2.14) (1.35) (1.63) 
n = 29 n = 36 n = 33 n = 34 
Support 7.24 7.94 6.67 7.65 
(2.26) (1.82) (2.84) (2.51) 
n = 29 n = 36 n = 33 n = 34 
Negative 7.41 6.69 6.21 7.29 
(2.08) (2.29) (2.07) (2.46) 
n = 29 n = 36 n = 33 n = 34 
Positive 7.14 7.06 7.55 7.68 
(2.36) (2.89) (2.61) (2.56) 
n = 29 n = 36 n = 33 n = 34 
Influence 3.76 4.86 3.91 3.21 
(2.64) (2.43) (2.38) (2.80) 
n = 29 n = 36 n = 33 n = 34 
Suspicious 2.57 2.00 2.00 2.33 
(2.75) (2.71) (2.59) (2.37) 
n = 29 n = 36 n = 33 n = 34 
d" MSE 
0.42 .52 0.12 0.03 .86 0.02 0.17 .68 0.13 4.62 
1.47 .23 0.24 0.82 .37 0.11 0.05 .95 0.09 2.60 
4.18 .04 0.36 1.16 .28 0.20 0.09 .77 0.12 5.70 
0.27 .60 0.10 0.69 .41 0.12 4.98 .02 0.80 5.03 
0.02 .88 0.00 1.05 .31 0.20 0.02 .89 0.08 6.86 
0.19 .66 0.41 2.76 .10 0.31 3.99 .05 0.69 6.63 
0.07 .80 0.04 0.07 .80 0.06 0.98 .32 0.09 6.80 
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Feedback did not affect participants' reports of how they made their decision. A test for the 
equality of proportions revealed that participants who received confirming feedback were as likely to 
report that their decision was immediate as were participants who received disconfirming feedback 
(23% versus 17%), z = 0.70, g = .24. 
The Question-knowledge Variable 
The two-way Feedback x Question-knowledge ANOVAs revealed no significant main effects 
for the question-knowledge variable, all Fs(l, 127) < 2.77, gs > .10. 
Simple main effects were calculated for the question-knowledge variable in the disconfirming 
and confirming feedback conditions for the dependent measures included in the question-knowledge 
manipulation (certain, basis, ease, and long). No simple main effects of the question-knowledge 
variable were significant in the confirming feedback condition, all Fs(l, 67) < 3.32, gs > .07. No 
simple main effects of the question-knowledge variable were significant in the disconfirming 
feedback condition, all Fs(l. 60) < 2.52. gs > .12. 
The question-knowledge variable did not affect participants' reports of how they made their 
decision. A test for the equality of proportions revealed that participants in the question-knowledge 
condition were as likely to report that their decision was immediate as were participants in the no 
question-knowledge condition (18% versus 23%). z = 0.71. g = .24. 
The Feedback x Question-knowledge Interactions 
The question-knowledge manipulation reduced the magnitude of the feedback effect on 
participants' recalled certainty, interaction F(l. 127) = 5.67. g = .02. In the no question-knowledge 
condition, confirming feedback significantly inflated participants' certainty reports, compared to 
disconfirming feedback (M = 63.06. SD = 25.84 and M = 46.90, SD = 23.01, respectively), F(l. 63) = 
6.92. p = .01. However, in the question-knowledge condition, confirming feedback did not inflate 
certainty reports, compared to disconfirming feedback (M = 52.65, SD = 26.21 and M = 55.15, SD -
17.87. respectively), F(l, 65) = 0.21, g = .65. 
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There were significant interactions between the feedback and question-knowledge variables 
on three other dependent measures: participants' reports of their ability to detect variations in 
people's tone of voice ('"voice"), reports of the extent to which they recalled the person who had the 
affair making negative comments about the relationship or their partner ("negative comments"), and 
reports of the extent to which feedback influenced their answers ("influence"), all Fs(l, 127) > 3.77, 
gs < .05 (see Table 5 for all relevant statistics). For two of those dependent measures (voice and 
influence), the pattern of the interaction was similar: confirming feedback significantly (or marginally 
significantly) inflated reports in the no question-knowledge condition, but not in the question-
knowledge condition. For the third dependent measure, negative comments, the pattern of the 
interaction was reversed: confirming feedback inflated reports in the question-knowledge condition 
but not in the no question-knowledge condition. Each interaction is described in detail below. 
For participants' reports of their ability to detect variations in people's tone of voice, the 
Feedback x Question-knowledge interaction revealed that, in the no question-knowledge condition, 
confirming feedback significantly inflated participants' reports of their ability to detect variations in 
people's tone of voice, compared to disconfirming feedback (M = 7.53, SD = 1.18 and M = 6.38, SD 
= 1.78, respectively), F(l. 63) = 9.69. g < .01. In contrast, in the question-knowledge condition, 
confirming feedback did not significantly inflate participants' reports compared to disconfirming 
feedback (M = 7.00. SD = 2.02 and M = 6.97, SD = 1.59. respectively), F(l, 65) = 0.01, g = .95. 
The effect of confirming versus disconfirming feedback effect on participants' reports of how 
much the feedback influenced them was larger in the no question-knowledge condition (M = 4.86, SD 
= 2.43 and M = 3.76, SD = 2.64. respectively), F(l. 63) = 3.06, g = .09, than in the question-
knowledge condition (M = 3.21. SD = 2.80 and M = 3.91. SD = 2.38, respectively) F(l, 65) = 1.22, g 
= .27. 
The pattern of the Feedback x Question-Knowledge interaction on participants' reports of the 
extent to which they noticed the person who had the affair make negative comments about the 
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relationship or their partner was unique; confirming feedback inflated participants' reports in the 
question-knowledge condition but not in the no question-knowledge condition. In the no question-
knowledge condition, confirming feedback did not inflate participants' reports, compared to 
disconfirming feedback (M = 6.69. SD = 2.29 and M = 7.41, SD = 2.08, respectively), F(l, 63) = 
1.72, g = .20. In contrast, in the question-knowledge condition, confirming feedback inflated 
participants' reports, compared to disconfirming feedback (M = 7.29, SD = 2.46 and M = 6.21, SD = 
2.07, respectively), F(l, 65) = 3.79, g = .05. 
None of the remaining Feedback x Question-knowledge interactions were significant, all 
Fs( 1, 127) < 2.41, gs > .12 (see Table 5). However, the means on six out of 11 dependent measures 
(attention, ease, long, non-verbals, hostile, and frustrated) were consistent with the predicted 
moderation pattern; the difference between confirming and disconfirming feedback conditions was 
smaller in the question-knowledge condition than it was in the no question-knowledge condition. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 introduced a question-knowledge manipulation, designed to eliminate the 
hypothesis that the post-decision feedback effect, demonstrated in Experiment 1, is due to 
participants' concerns about self-presentation: half of the participants in this experiment were 
randomly assigned to see some questions they would be asked about the video before answering the 
dependent measures, half did not see the questions they would be asked about the video. The 
presence of a specific Feedback x Question-knowledge interaction pattern supports the notion that the 
post-decision feedback effect is not due to participants' self-presentation concerns. Specifically, the 
predicted Feedback x Question-knowledge interaction was one in which the magnitude of the post-
decision feedback effect is smaller in the question-knowledge condition than in the no question-
knowledge condition. The predicted interaction pattern appeared on three dependent measures: 
participants' reports of their certainty at the time of their decision, their general ability to notice 
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variations in people's tone of voice, and their reports of the extent to which the feedback influenced 
their answers; the question-knowledge variable moderates the post-decision feedback effect.5 
Although the predicted pattern of Feedback x Question-knowledge interactions only appeared 
on three dependent measures, the patterns of means on six other dependent measures was consistent 
with the predicted interaction (see Table 5). Also, the Feedback x Question-knowledge interaction 
was significant in the predicted direction on what is arguably the most important dependent measure: 
participants' reports of their certainty at the time of the decision. In the domain of eyewitness 
identifications, for example, certainty is a vital dependent measure because it forms the basis of 
intuitive evaluations of eyewitness identification accuracy. Judges and juries believe that a witness's 
certainty report is highly indicative of his or her identification accuracy (e.g., Lindsay. 1994). In 
other decision-making contexts, then, it is reasonable to assume that certainty reports are also viewed 
as indicative of accuracy (e.g.. Bless & S track, 1998). 
In spite of the fact that the question-knowledge manipulation reduced the magnitude of the 
feedback effect for some dependent measures, the typical post-decision feedback effect was still 
observed in Experiment 2. As in Experiment 1, it is important to remember two characteristics of this 
experimental paradigm. First, participants were randomly assigned to condition. Second, feedback 
was administered to participants after the video was over and after their decision was made. 
Therefore, any observed differences in participants' reports are due to the feedback manipulation, 
rather than to any pre-feedback differences between groups. Confirming feedback inflated 
participants' reports of the basis they had for their decision, the length of time it took to make their 
decision, the certainty with which the decision was made, the ease with which the decision was made, 
and the extent to which they are good at making judgments about others in general. 
5 The fourth significant Feedback x Question-knowledge interaction, on participants' reports of the extent to 
which they noticed negative comments from either member of the couple, did not show the predicted pattern; 
confirming feedback inflated participants' reports in the question-knowledge condition but not in the no 
question-knowledge condition. 
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Confirming feedback also inflated reports on two dependent measures that were new to 
Experiment 2. For example, confirming feedback inflated participants' reports of how good they are, 
in general, at detecting variations in people's tone of voice, consistent with the notion that the post-
decision feedback effect influences a broad range of dependent measures, including those that are 
related to general abilities, rather than details of the video or decision. In addition, confirming 
feedback caused participants to report noticing fewer supportive comments from either member of the 
couple, consistent with the argument that the post-decision feedback paradigm distorts recollections 
of the past. 
The magnitude of the post-decision feedback effect is smaller in the question-knowledge 
condition than in the no question-knowledge condition. Therefore, self-presentation is not an 
adequate explanation for the post-decision feedback effect. As noted earlier, the self-presentation 
explanation for the post-decision feedback effect depends on the assumption that participants are 
interested in promoting a positive image of themselves. For example, in the confirming feedback 
condition, participants might inflate their reports of how certain they were at the time of their 
decision, attempting to communicate information about the confidence with which one makes 
decisions (i.e.. assuming that a skilled decision maker is confident about his or her decision). If 
participants are motivated by the desire to present themselves well, the question-knowledge 
manipulation should not have affected the magnitude of the post-decision feedback effect. 
Because Experiment 2 demonstrated that self-presentation is not a viable explanation for the 
post-decision feedback effect, alternative hypotheses are necessary. These hypotheses must be able to 
account for the distortions in recollections that characterize the post-decision feedback effect. They 
must also be able to explain the moderation of the feedback effect by the question-knowledge 
manipulation. Many theories account for distortions in judgments (e.g., hindsight bias; Fischhoff, 
1975a), but these theories do not provide an explanation for how recollections of judgments are 
distorted, they provide information about how current judgments are distorted. 
34 
Two alternative hypotheses have the characteristics necessary for an adequate explanation of 
the post-decision feedback effect; they explain both the moderation of the post-decision feedback 
effect by the question-knowledge manipulation and the distortion of participants* recollections. 
These hypotheses are biased search of memory versus anchoring and adjustment. The biased search 
of memory hypothesis suggests that people undergo a search of memory when confronted with the 
dependent measures questionnaire. According to this hypothesis, post-decision feedback distorts 
reports because searches of memory are contaminated by the feedback information. The anchoring 
and adjustment hypothesis argues that participants answer the dependent measures questionnaire by 
making an adjustment from the anchor of their current feelings which is established by the feedback 
(e.g., "The experimenter told me that my decision was correct so I'm confident that I made an 
accurate choice."). According to this hypothesis, feedback distorts participants' reports because the 
adjustment from the anchor of current feelings is insufficient. 
The biased search of memory and anchoring and adjustment hypotheses do not assume that 
participants purposefully distort their reports in order to promote a positive image. Instead, these 
hypotheses argue that post-feedback answers are good-faith constructions rather than self-biased 
distortions. These hypotheses can easily explain the moderation of the post-identification feedback 
effect by a question-knowledge manipulation. In fact, both hypotheses would predict just such a 
moderation. Each hypothesis is described in detail in the following sections. 
Anchoring and Adjustment 
Anchoring and adjustment is a well-known heuristic in which people's estimates are 
influenced by initial values or starting points. Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) classic example of 
anchoring and adjustment involved a question about the percentage of African countries in the United 
Nations. Before people were asked to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United 
Nations, a wheel with numbers from 0 to 100 along its edge was spun in their presence. After the 
wheel landed on a number (e.g., 35), participants estimated whether the percentage of African 
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countries in the United Nations was higher or lower than that number. After doing so, participants 
estimated the actual percentage of African countries in the United Nations. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) demonstrated that the initial value or starting point, albeit an arbitrary one, served as an anchor 
for subsequent estimates. From that anchor, participants made an insufficient adjustment when asked 
to estimate the actual percentage of African countries in the United Nations. For example, 
participants for whom the wheel stopped at 10 estimated the percentage to be 25% whereas 
participants for whom the wheel stopped at 65 estimated the percentage to be 45%. Participants made 
an insufficient adjustment from the initial, arbitrary anchor (e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971). 
Anchoring and adjustment is a robust phenomenon. For example, research indicates that 
mock jurors' compensation awards in a personal injury trial are biased by the amount of money 
requested by the plaintiffs (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996), people's estimations of how they appear to 
others is a function of an insufficient adjustment from their own subjective experience (Gilovich, 
Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000), judgments about ability to solve anagrams and persistence at an anagram 
task are influenced by a pre-task prediction of how many anagrams will be solved compared to a 
randomly determined anchor (Cervone & Peake, 1986), and real estate agents' estimates of the value 
of a house are affected by the listing price (Northcraft & Neale. 1987). Even anchors that are 
revealed to be unreliable influence subsequent estimates. Whyte and Sebenius (1997) asked 
participants to indicate the lowest price they would accept to sell a product to a foreign competitor's 
company. Whyte and Sebenius (1997) manipulated the amount participants thought the competitor's 
firm was willing to pay. However, before revealing the lowest price they would accept, participants 
learned that the price quoted by the competitor was not accurate; the translator made an error in 
transmitting the information. Therefore, the price quoted did not reflect how much the firm was 
actually willing to pay. Even when the anchors were revealed to be unreliable, participants' final 
prices were affected. 
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Interpreting the post-decision feedback effect in light of research on anchoring and 
adjustment suggests a way of explaining the observed data. Perhaps feedback information activates a 
set of current feelings (i.e., a starting point) from which insufficient adjustments are made when the 
dependent measures are answered. For example, current feelings among participants who have 
received confirming feedback could include high certainty in the accuracy of their decision and a 
perception that the decision task was easy. However, an adjustment from those current feelings needs 
to be made because the dependent measures ask participants to recall aspects of the past, rather than 
report current feelings. For example, participants are asked to recall how certain they were at the time 
the decision was made and how easy the task seemed at the time. Therefore, in order to answer the 
questions, participants need to adjust their current feelings. In adjusting current feelings, participants 
must take into account how the feedback information might have influenced them (e.g., T know I 
made the right choice because the experimenter told me I did, but when I made my decision I 
probably wasn't quite as sure as I am now."). Although the anchor is established automatically (when 
the feedback is administered), the adjustment itself is presumed to be an effortful, deliberative process 
(e.g., see Gilovich et al.. 2000). 
The ability of participants to make an appropriate adjustment from their current feelings by 
assessing the extent to which the feedback influenced them is questionable. For example, Wells and 
Bradfield (1998) noted that participants were equally influenced by feedback, regardless of whether 
they reported being uninfluenced or admitted to being influenced. According to those data, then, 
participants are not capable of determining how much the feedback influenced their current feelings. 
It is not surprising that participants in Wells and Bradfield (1998) were unable to articulate the 
influence of feedback on their answers to the dependent measures. Empirical research has firmly 
established the fact that people are not always capable of perceiving influences on their opinions or 
behavior (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Porter & Woodworth, 2000; Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 
1989; Wilson, Hull. & Johnson. 1981). An excellent illustration of this inability comes from research 
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on bystander apathy: "Subjects persistently claimed that their behavior was not influenced by the 
other people present. This denial occurred in the face of results showing that the presence of others 
did inhibit helping." (Latané & Darley, 1970, p. 124). Because people underestimate the extent to 
which the feedback has contributed to their current feelings, adjustments that take feedback into 
account will be insufficient. 
How does an insufficient adjustment from current feelings explain the distortions observed in 
the post-decision feedback paradigm? Participants who receive disconfirming feedback start from a 
different set of current feelings than do participants who receive confirming feedback. Therefore, 
each group has a different point from which to adjust as they account for the influence of the 
feedback. Because those adjustments are insufficient, the resulting pattern of data reveals a distortion 
in which confirming feedback inflates reports and disconfirming feedback deflates reports (compared 
to a control group which receives no feedback). 
Recall that participants in Experiment 2 who were asked to think about their experience 
before receiving feedback information were not as influenced by feedback as were participants who 
did not think about their experience before receiving feedback. One explanation for these results is 
that participants do not contemplate any aspect of their experience until confronted with the 
dependent measures. At that point, participants must interpret their experience in light of the 
information learned about accuracy. They are unable to recall pre-feedback thoughts because they 
did not ponder their experience before receiving feedback: there are no pre-feedback thoughts to 
recollect. In contrast, participants who have thought about their experience have a clear recollection 
on which to base answers to the dependent measures. 
The anchoring and adjustment hypothesis presents a viable alternative to the self-presentation 
explanation for the post-decision feedback effect. In addition, it extends research on anchoring and 
adjustment. Previous research has been limited to how anchors affect subjective likelihood estimates 
whereas this research investigates how anchors affect reports of prior experiences. Finally, the 
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anchoring and adjustment hypothesis is able to explain the moderation of the post-decision feedback 
effect with the question-knowledge manipulation, an important improvement on the self-presentation 
hypothesis. However, anchoring and adjustment is not the only alternative to self-presentation. The 
biased memory search hypothesis is described in detail below. 
Biased Search of Memory 
The biased search of memory hypothesis is derived from Schacter's (1999) definition of the 
bias sin of memory. Schacter defined bias as ".. .the distorting influences of present knowledge, 
beliefs, and feelings on recollection of previous experiences." (Schacter, 1999, p. 193). The tendency 
to produce biased recollections of the past is partly driven by people's desire to maintain consistency 
between present and past feelings, attitudes, and beliefs. Early models of social behavior and thought 
emphasized the importance of consistency to social thinkers, viewing them as "consistency seekers" 
(e.g., see Fiske & Taylor, 1991). For example, Festinger's ( 1957) theory of cognitive dissonance is 
predicated on the notion that people are motivated to avoid the discomfort caused by inconsistency 
between an attitude (e.g., seeing oneself as health-conscious) and a behavior (e.g., smoking 
regularly). 
Desire for consistency not only plays a role in reconciling attitudes and behavior, it guides 
recollections of the past. People selectively recall and seek information that confirms their existing 
beliefs (e.g., see Karney & Coombs, 2000: Myers, 1999). For example, Asch (1940) manipulated 
whether participants believed that politicians were rated positively or negatively by 500 of their 
fellow students. When participants believed politicians were admired, they immediately brought to 
mind examples of politicians who were viewed with respect (e.g., Teddy Roosevelt). 
More recently, Spiro (1980) demonstrated that participants recalled different aspects of a 
story depending on their belief about the outcome. Participants read a story about Bob and Margie, a 
couple about to be married. In the course of the story, participants learned that Bob did not want to 
have children. In half of the stories, Margie was "elated" to hear that Bob did not want children. In 
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the other half of the stories, Margie was "horrified" to learn that Bob did not want children. Later, 
participants learned that Bob and Margie were happily married or that their engagement had broken 
off. Results indicated that participants recalled elements of the story that were consistent with their 
belief about the outcome. For example, participants who heard that Margie was horrified that Bob 
did not want children and then learned that they were happily married mistakenly recalled that the 
couple "... underwent counseling to correct the major discrepancy." (Spiro, 1980, p. 91). The 
outcome information activated a certain set of feelings or beliefs about the relationship between Bob 
and Margie. Subsequently, the desire for consistency between current feelings, or knowledge, and 
memories of the story guided recollections of the story so that consistency between the present and 
the past could be maintained. 
Arguably, participants in the post-decision feedback paradigm also engage in a search of 
memory, initiated when they are confronted with the dependent measures questionnaire. 
Conceptualizing participants' reports as the result of a memory search provides an important 
alternative to the anchoring and adjustment explanation of the post-decision feedback effect. If 
participants search their memories to answer questions about their experience, that search must be 
biased in some way because it produces distorted reports; compared to participants who have received 
disconfirming feedback, those who have received confirming feedback recall having been more 
confident than they actually were, making the decision more quickly than they actually did, and so on. 
People's well-established desire for consistency offers some insight into how a memory 
search could be biased by feedback information. Perhaps feedback distorts participants' reports by 
guiding their searches of memory in a particular way, one that maintains consistency between 
recollections and the set of feelings (or "knowledge") activated by the feedback. For example, 
participants who have received confirming feedback might search for elements of their experience 
that are consistent with being correct whereas participants who have received disconfirming feedback 
might search for recollections consistent with being incorrect. Supporting this notion, Bartlett noted 
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that an "'...emotional halo [may] lead to inventions, and to a constructive type of remembering which 
may disturb the accuracy of recall." (Bartlett, 1932, p. 264). 
Memories consistent with being correct, for example, include confidence in one's decision, a 
perception that the task was easy, a perception that the decision was fast, and a perception that there 
was a good basis for the decision. In contrast, memories consistent with being incorrect include a 
lack of confidence in one's decision, a perception that the task was difficult, a perception that the 
decision was slow, and a perception that there was not a good basis for the decision. In reality, 
participants probably have memories consistent with being incorrect and memories consistent with 
being correct. However, by searching memory only for examples of feedback-consistent thoughts 
and feelings, participants amass a biased set of recollections. Answering the dependent measures 
based on that biased set of recollections could produce the distorted reports observed in post-decision 
feedback experiments. As does the anchoring and adjustment hypothesis, the biased search of 
memory hypothesis predicts moderation of the post-decision feedback effect with the question-
knowledge manipulation. If participants are instructed to think about their experience before 
receiving feedback, they will be able to amass a set of pre-feedback recollections that are unbiased. 
Therefore, their reports should not be distorted. 
Both the biased search of memory hypothesis and the anchoring and adjustment hypothesis 
can explain how the question-knowledge manipulation moderates the post-decision feedback effect, 
something the self-presentation explanation has difficulty doing. Experiment 3 was conducted to test 
between the alternative explanations for the post-decision feedback effect: anchoring and adjustment 
versus biased search of memory. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
Both alternative hypotheses (anchoring and adjustment and biased search of memory) predict 
that the question-knowledge manipulation will moderate the post-decision feedback effect. 
Experiment 3 was designed to distinguish between the alternative hypotheses by introducing a 
manipulation for which the hypotheses make opposite predictions. 
Recall that one alternative to the self-presentation hypothesis is that participants engage in a 
biased search of memory when answering the dependent measures. This hypothesis argues that the 
dependent measures initiate a search of memory for information consistent with the feedback. 
Accordingly, feedback produces a biased set of recollections from which participants draw their 
answers to the dependent measures questionnaire. If the post-decision feedback effect is due to a 
biased search of memory, it implies that the effect could be eliminated if participants' biased memory 
searches were prevented. One way to prevent participants from collecting a biased set of memories is 
to truncate their search process. If participants have to give a report about prior certainty, for 
example, without having time to sort through their memory for feedback-consistent recollections, 
reports might not be distorted (cf. "premature output" manipulations, e.g., Gilbert, 1991). 
Another way of preventing participants from collecting a biased set of memories is to impair 
their ability to conduct a thorough search of memory. This can be accomplished by forcing 
participants to engage in a simultaneous task while answering the dependent measures, one which 
competes for their mental resources (i.e.. a "cognitive load" manipulation, e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & 
Krull. 1988). For example, asking participants to retain an eight digit number in memory while 
answering the dependent measures would occupy some mental resources, allowing fewer to be 
devoted to the search for feedback-consistent memories. 
These external demands, forcing quick responses to the dependent measures (i.e., premature 
output) and introducing competing tasks (i.e., cognitive load), should interrupt participants' search for 
feedback-consistent memories, leading them to base their reports on a less biased set of recollections. 
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Therefore, if the post-decision feedback effect is a biased search phenomenon, making demands on 
participants' cognitive resources should decrease the magnitude of the effect: participants' reports 
should be less distorted when their cognitive resources are diverted than when they are not diverted. 
Importantly, external demands on participants should not decrease the magnitude of the post-
decision feedback effect if it is an anchoring and adjustment phenomenon. Instead, the expectation is 
for the exact opposite results; taxing participants' cognitive resources should increase the size of the 
post-decision feedback effect, rather than decrease it. Recall that the anchoring and adjustment 
hypothesis argues that feedback automatically establishes an anchor of current feelings from which an 
adjustment is made when answering the dependent measures. That adjustment, which is insufficient, 
results in distorted reports. Because the adjustment is an effortful process, it should be disrupted by 
manipulations that force participants to answer questions quickly or tax their cognitive resources. 
Previous research indicates that people are unable to adjust from an established anchor under 
conditions of "cognitive busyness" (Allison & Beggan, 1994). Under conditions of cognitive load, 
then, participants' reports will be largely based on current feelings (i.e., the anchor). Reports based 
on current feelings should be particularly distorted because they do not incorporate any adjustment to 
account for the influence of feedback. Therefore, if participants' cognitive resources are taxed, the 
magnitude of the post-decision feedback effect should increase, rather than decrease, because reports 
will be based on current feelings (i.e., the anchor established by feedback) rather than on reports that 
account for the influence of feedback (i.e., ones subjected to the effortful adjustment process). 
The fact that external demand manipulations make opposite predictions for the two potential 
explanations of the post-decision feedback effect suggests a clear means of determining which 
possibility best explains the effect. If external demands on participants increase the magnitude of the 
post-decision feedback effect, the anchoring and adjustment explanation is supported. In contrast, if 
external demands on participants decrease the magnitude of the post-decision feedback effect, the 
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biased search process explanation is supported. Experiment 3 was designed to test these possibilities 
against one another using manipulations that place demands on participants' cognitive resources. 
Forcing participants to answer the dependent measures in a short amount of time (i.e., forcing 
premature output) and giving them a simultaneous task when answering the dependent measures (i.e., 
inducing cognitive load) both introduce demands on cognitive resources. In essence, these demands 
"constrain" the cognitive resources or processing capability of participants. This experiment was 
designed to assess the effect of each of these constraints on the magnitude of the post-decision 
feedback effect. 
There is no prior research using resource constraint manipulations in this paradigm. 
Accordingly, it is unclear what type of constraint (time pressure or cognitive load) would be best 
suited to interfere with cognitive resources while allowing participants to answer the dependent 
measures questionnaire. Therefore, both types of resource constraint were used. The use of two 
types of constraint, combined factorially, also allowed a test of multiple levels of resource constraint 
(e.g., no constraint, cognitive load only, premature output only, or both). In the premature output + 
cognitive load condition participants had a limited time to answer questions and were engaged in a 
simultaneous task while completing dependent measures questionnaire. In addition, because each 
constraint was tested alone, it was also possible to measure the independent effect of premature 
output versus cognitive load. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants (N = 429; 294 female) were undergraduate psychology students at Iowa State 
University. They were given extra credit in their psychology classes in exchange for their 
participation. Participants were randomly assigned to no resource constraint, premature output, 
cognitive load, and resource constraint (premature output + cognitive load) conditions. Participants 
were also randomly assigned to feedback conditions. The resulting design was a 2 (Confirming 
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Feedback vs. Disconfirming Feedback) x 2 (Cognitive Load vs. No Cognitive Load) x 2 (Time 
Pressure vs. No Time Pressure) fully randomized, between-participants factorial. Finally, some 
participants were randomly assigned to a control condition in which they received no feedback and 
were not under any resource constraint while answering the dependent measures. Therefore, there 
were nine experimental conditions total (see Figure 1). 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants watched the same videotape used in Experiments 1 and 2. After watching the 
videotape, participants made a decision about which member of the couple had an affair. After 
making a decision, participants were randomly assigned to one of nine conditions: No Feedback/No 
Resource Constraint, Confirming Feedback/No Resource Constraint, Disconfirming Feedback/No 
Resource Constraint, Confirming Feedback/Premature Output, Disconfirming Feedback/Premature 
Output. Confirming Feedback/Cognitive Load, Disconfirming Feedback/Cognitive Load, Confirming 
Feedback/Premature Output + Cognitive Load, or Disconfirming Feedback/Premature Output + 
Cognitive Load. Participants in the confirming feedback conditions heard "I wanted to let you know 
that I noticed that you were right in your choice of which person had the affair." Participants in the 
disconfirming feedback conditions heard: "I wanted to let you know that I noticed that the person you 
chose was actually not the one who had the affair. It was the other person who had an affair." 
All participants then answered the same questions used in Experiment 2. However, all 
participants viewed the dependent measures on a video screen. Questions were transferred to a 
videotape using Dazzle (1999), a computer program for editing videotapes. Each question was 
presented individually and participants indicated their responses in writing (Appendix F). 
Participants in the various conditions answered the questions under different circumstances. 
Participants in the no resource constraint condition had ample time to answer each question carefully. 
This is the usual procedure employed in post-decision feedback experiments. For participants in the 
premature output condition, the presentation of the dependent measures was timed so that participants 
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Confirming Feedback 
No cognitive load Cognitive load 
No time pressure 
Time pressure 
Disconfirming Feedback 
No cognitive load Cognitive load 
No time pressure 
Time pressure 
Control-No feedback 
No cognitive load 
No time pressure 
Figure 1. Design of Experiment 3 
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had a limited amount of time to contemplate and respond to each question. Each question was shown 
to participants for 5 sec. Participants in the cognitive load condition were given an eight digit number 
to keep in memory while they were answering the dependent measures. They were told that the 
experimenter would ask them to repeat that number at the end of the experiment. Participants did not 
actually complete a recall test. Participants in the resource constraint condition answered the 
dependent measures under premature output and cognitive load conditions. They had a limited 
amount of time to answer each question and they were given an eight digit number to keep in 
memory. All participants answered practice questions before completing the dependent measures 
(see Appendix G). After completing the dependent measures questionnaire, participants were 
thanked for their participation, debriefed, and dismissed (see Appendix H for debriefing). 
Results 
The data were analyzed with a series of planned contrasts (see Table 2 for pooled correlations 
among the dependent measures across all three experiments) using the error term from a one-way 
ANOVA across the nine cells of the design. Each dependent measure was analyzed using the 
participants who gave responses to that particular question.6 Results indicating that the resource 
constraint manipulations increased the magnitude of the feedback effect are consistent with the 
anchoring and adjustment hypothesis. In contrast, results indicating that the resource constraint 
manipulations decreased the magnitude of the feedback effect are consistent with the biased search of 
memory hypothesis. These hypotheses were tested with Feedback x Cognitive Load, Feedback x 
Time Pressure, and Feedback x Cognitive Load x Time Pressure interactions. First, the main effects 
of each of the independent variables are described below. 
6 A negligible number of participants failed to complete the dependent measures questionnaire. Across all 
dependent measures, the average percentage of missing data was less than 1% in each of the following four 
conditions: control, time pressure, cognitive load, and time pressure + cognitive load. 
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Main Effects of the Feedback Variable 
The effect of the feedback variable was tested in three ways. First, compared to 
disconfirming feedback, confirming feedback inflated participants' reports of certainty, basis, ease, 
length, judgments, non-verbals, voice, negative, and suspicious (see Table 6 for means, see Table 7 
for t values). Second, compared to the control condition, disconfirming feedback lowered 
participants' reports of certainty, attention, basis, ease, hostile, anxiety, frustrate, supportive, and 
suspicious (see Table 8 for t values). Finally, compared to the control condition, confirming feedback 
inflated participants' reports of certainty, basis, ease, length, hostile, anxiety, frustrate, positive, 
influence of feedback, and suspicious (see Table 9 for t values). 
Compared to the control condition, disconfirming feedback decreased participants' estimates 
of the percentage of time that the female member of the couple talked (M = 33.72, SD = 18.90 and M 
= 27.38, SD = 16.41, respectively), t(8,419) = 2.02, g = .04. There were no other significant effects 
of the feedback variable on participants' estimates of the actual length of the videotape and the actual 
percentage of time that the female member of the couple talked, ts(8, 420) < 1.01, ps > .31 and ts(8. 
419) < 1.35, gs > .18. Recall that participants made those estimations after indicating whether the 
video was longer or shorter than 20 minutes (96.2% reported that it was shorter than 20 minutes) and 
whether the female member of the couple talked for more or less than 10% of the time (64.7% 
reported that she talked for more than 10% of the time). 
A test for the equality of proportions revealed that participants who received confirming 
feedback were more likely to report that their decision was immediate than were participants who 
received disconfirming feedback (37% versus 12%), z = 8.06, g < .05. 
Main Effects of the Time Pressure Variable 
There were significant main effects of the time pressure variable on five dependent measures. 
Compared to participants in the no time pressure condition, those in the time pressure condition 
reported having a better basis on which to make their decision, noticing less hostility between 
Table 6. Means, standard deviations, and effect sizes for dependent measures in Experiment 3 
Confirming feedback Disconfirming feedback 
Time pressure No time pressure Time pressure No time pressure 
Load No load Load No load Load No load Load No load Control 
Dependent 
measure 
Certain 72.39 74.85 72.58 71.62 44.92 35.59 38.79 36.46 54.06 
(17.06) (17.70) (20.33) (16.45) (22.72) (20.63) (21.62) (23.01) (19.49) 
n = 67 n = 33 n = 31 n = 68 n = 65 n = 34 n = 33 n = 65 n = 32 
Attention 8.30 8.41 8.48 8.16 7.80 8.12 8.21 8.40 8.81 
(1.40) (1.23) (0.96) (1.50) (1.81) (1.20) (1.24) (1.39) (1.00) 
n = 67 n = 34 n = 31 n = 68 n = 65 n = 34 n = 33 n = 65 n = 32 
Basis 6.80 7.12 6.19 6.24 4.94 3.94 3.45 3.86 4.90 
(1.41) (1.55) (1.90) (1.96) (2.02) (1.92) (1.87) (1.88) (2.21) 
n = 65 n = 34 n = 31 n = 68 n = 63 n = 33 n = 33 n = 65 n = 31 
Easy 3.55 4.09 4.26 4.12 6.03 6.82 6.70 6.98 5.72 
(2.03) (2.27) (2.32) (2.32) (2.07) (1.90) (1.90) (1.95) (2.23) 
n = 67 n = 34 n = 31 n - 68 n = 63 n = 33 n = 33 n = 65 n = 32 
Length 3.52 3.24 3.10 3.62 4.28 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.44 
(2.14) (2.41) (1.72) (2.22) (2.40) (2.06) (2.41) (2.24) (2.17) 
n = 66 n = 34 n = 31 n = 68 n = 65 n = 34 n = 33 n = 65 n = 32 
Judgments 6.83 7.03 7.03 6.40 6.15 6.03 6.03 6.17 6.44 
(1.53) (1.53) (1.11) (1.90) (1.53) (1.38) (1.78) (1.60) (1.34) 
n = 66 n = 34 n = 31 n = 68 n = 65 n = 34 n = 33 n = 65 n = 32 
Non-verbals 6.55 6.06 6.55 6.25 6.55 7.03 7.06 6.75 6.63 
(1.61) (1.56) (1.92) (1.56) (1.61) (1.36) (1.29) (1.77) (1.36) 
n = 67 n = 34 n = 31 n = 68 n = 65 n = 34 n = 33 n = 65 n = 32 
Voice 7.24 7.56 7.23 7.28 7.11 6.56 6.97 6.51 6.81 
(1.43) (1.21) (1.80) (1.49) (1.44) (1.37) (1.98) (1.57) (1.42) 
n = 67 n = 34 n = 31 n = 68 n = 65 n = 34 n = 33 n = 65 n = 32 
Hostile 5.54 5.65 6.40 5.93 5.86 5.65 6.06 5.85 5.00 
(1.89) (1.79) (1.54) (1.93) (1.86) (1.92) (1.84) (1.81) (2.13) 
n = 67 n = 34 n= 31 n = 68 n = 65 n = 34 n = 33 n = 65 n = 32 
Note. Row headings correspond to words in bold in Appendix E. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Table 6. (continued) 
Confirming feedback Disconfirming feedback 
Time pressure No time pressure Time pressure No time pressure 
Load No load Load No load Load No load Load No load Control 
Dependent 
measure 
Anxiety 5.45 5.12 5.81 5.35 5.92 5.85 5.36 5.49 4.66 
(1.73) (1.85) (2.20) (2.01) (1.78) (1.62) (2.01) (1.84) (2.10) 
n = 67 n = 33 n = 31 n = 68 n = 64 n = 33 n = 33 n = 65 n = 32 
Frustrate 7.19 7.18 7.84 7.85 7.48 7.61 7.24 7.65 6.84 
(1.60) (1.57) (1.39) (1.17) (1.34) (1.03) (1.20) (1.76) (1.46) 
n = 67 n = 34 n = 31 n " 68 n = 65 n = 33 n = 33 n = 65 n = 32 
Supportive 7.21 7.68 7.81 7.69 6.65 7.56 7.28 7.05 8.16 
(2.26) (1.45) (2.02) (2.03) (2.46) (2.25) (2.68) (2.58) (2.20) 
n = 66 n = 34 n = 31 n = 68 n = 65 n = 34 n = 32 n = 65 n = 32 
Negative 7.25 7.88 7.87 6.64 6.92 6.12 7.19 6.91 6.69 
(2.10) (1.56) (1.71) (2.74) (1.57) (2.48) (2.34) (2.35) (2.60) 
n = 65 n = 33 n = 31 n = 67 n = 65 11= 34 n = 31 n = 64 n = 26 
Positive 6.81 6.30 6.94 7.06 6.54 6.33 7.88 6.69 7.92 
(2.46) (3.11) (3.18) (2.72) (2.47) (2.91) (2.34) (2.70) (2.53) 
n = 67 n = 33 n = 31 n-67 M = 65 n = 34 n = 32 n = 64 n = 26 
Influence 5.45 6.07 5.26 4.48 5.02 5.00 5.06 4.81 4.32 
(1.78) (1.41) (1.90) (2.40) ( 1 4 6 )  (1.74) (2.30) (2.34) (2.25) 
n = 64 n = 30 n = 31 n = 67 n = 63 n = 30 n = 32 n = 64 n = 25 
Suspicious 3.73 4.00 3.58 2.96 3.70 2.94 2.19 3.14 1.90 
(2.50) (2.62) (2.87) (2-93) (2.77) (2.47) (2.32) (2.50) (2.07) 
n = 66 n = 34 n = 31 n = 68 n = 64 n = 33 n = 32 n = 65 n = 30 
Note. Row headings correspond to words in bold in Appendix E. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Table 7. Statistics for effect of confirming feedback versus disconfirming feedback in Experiment 3 
Dependent measures 
Condition 
Certainty Basis Ease Length Judgments Non-verbals Voice Negative Suspicious 
t 15.88 12.75 11.64 6.13 4.33 3.04 3.33 2.62 2.05 
df 419 414 417 419 419 420 420 407 414 
e .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .04 
Note, df refers to degrees of freedom. 
Table 8. Statistics for effect of disconfirming feedback versus control in Experiment 3 
Dependent measures 
Condition 
Certainty Attention Basis Ease Hostile Anxiety Frustrate Support Suspicious 
t 3.94 2.53 2.36 2.25 2.38 2.75 2.37 2.34 2.11 
df 419 420 414 417 419 417 419 418 414 
B .01 .01 .02 .03 .02 .01 .02 .02 .04 
Note, df refers to degrees of freedom. 
LZl 
Table 9. Statistics for effect of confirming feedback versus control in Experiment 3 
Dependent measures 
Condition 
Certainty Basis Ease Length Hostile Anxiety Frustrate Positive Influence Suspicious 
4.89 4.65 4.22 2.51 2.44 2.14 2.45 2.03 2.31 3.23 
419 414 417 419 419 417 419 410 397 414 
.01 .01 .01 .01 .02 .03 .02 .04 .02 .01 
Note, df refers to degrees of freedom. 
Vl K> 
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members of the couple, recalling fewer positive comments made by the member of the couple who 
had the affair, being more influenced by the feedback, and being more suspicious that one member of 
the couple had an affair (see Table 10 for statistics). No other main effects of the time pressure 
variable were significant, gs > .07. 
There were no significant effects of the time pressure manipulation on participants' estimates 
of the length of the videotape or the percentage of time during which the female member of the 
couple talked, gs > .32. 
A test for the equality of proportions revealed that participants who were in the time pressure 
condition were more likely to report that their decision was immediate than were participants in the 
no time pressure condition (31% versus 17%), z = 3.50, g < .05. 
Main Effects of the Cognitive Load Variable 
There were no main effects of the cognitive load variable, gs > . 11. 
There were no significant effects of the cognitive load variable on participants' estimates of 
the length of the videotape or the percentage of time during which the female member of the couple 
talked, gs > .43. 
A test for the equality of proportions revealed that the cognitive load variable did not affect 
participants' reports of whether their decision was immediate; participants in the cognitive load 
Table 10. Statistics for main effect of time pressure in Experiment 3. 
Dependent measures 
Condition 
Basis Hostile Positive Influence Suspicious 
t 3.83 1.93 2.24 2.19 2.24 
df 414 419 410 397 414 
B .01 .05 .03 .03 .03 
Note, df refers to degrees of freedom. 
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condition were as likely to report that their decision was immediate as were participants in the no 
cognitive load condition (28% versus 21%), z = 1.75, g = ns. 
The Feedback x Time Pressure Interactions 
There was one significant Feedback x Time Pressure interaction. The time pressure variable 
decreased participants' reports of the extent to which either member of the couple was frustrated only 
when participants heard confirming feedback, interaction t(8, 419) = 2.49, g = .01. When participants 
heard confirming feedback, those in the time pressure condition reported noticing less frustration than 
did those in the no time pressure condition (M = 7.19, SD = 1.56 and M = 7.84, SD = 1.24, 
respectively), t(8, 419) = 3.06. g < .01. However, when participants heard disconfirming feedback, 
participants in the time pressure versus no time pressure conditions did not report noticing different 
levels of frustration in the couple (M = 7.52. SD =1.23 and M = 7.51, SD = 1.60 respectively), t(8, 
419) = 0.45, g = .65. 
The Feedback x Cognitive Load Interactions 
There was one significant Feedback x Cognitive Load interaction. The magnitude of the 
feedback effect on participants' reports of their ability to detect variations in people's tone of voice 
was smaller in the cognitive load condition than in the no cognitive load condition, interaction t(8, 
420) = 2.14. g = .03. In the no cognitive load condition, participants who heard confirming feedback 
reported better ability to detect variations in tone of voice compared to those who heard disconfirming 
feedback (M = 7.37, SD = 1.41 and M = 6.52, SD = 1.50 respectively), t(8, 420) = 3.91, g < .01. 
However, in the cognitive load condition, confirming versus disconfirming feedback did not affect 
participants' reported ability to detect variations in tone of voice (M = 7.23, SD = 1.55 and M = 7.06. 
SD = 1.63. respectively). t(8,420) = 0.84, g = .40. No other Feedback x Cognitive Load interactions 
were significant, gs > . 12. 
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The Feedback x Time Pressure x Cognitive Load Interactions 
There were three significant Feedback x Time Pressure x Cognitive Load interactions on 
participants' reports of the basis on which their decision was made ("basis"), the extent to which they 
noticed negative comments from the person who had the affair ("negative comments"), and the extent 
to which they were suspicious that one member of the couple might have had an affair ("suspicion"). 
t(8, 414) = 2.11, g = .04, t(8, 407) = 2.50, g = .01, t(8,414) = 2.33, g = .02, respectively (see Figures 
2, 3, and 4). 
Participants ' reports of basis. In the no time pressure condition, the Feedback x Cognitive 
Load interaction was not significant for participants' reports of the basis they had for their decision, 
t(8, 414) = 0.65, g = .52. However, in the time pressure condition, the magnitude of the feedback 
effect was smaller in the cognitive load condition than in the no cognitive load condition, interaction 
t(8, 414) = 2.35, g < .02. In the cognitive load condition, confirming feedback inflated participants' 
reports of the basis for their decision, compared to disconfirming feedback (M = 6.80, SD = 1.41 and 
M = 4.94, SD = 2.02, respectively). t(8, 414) = 5.67, g < .01, d = 0.83. In the no cognitive load 
condition, compared to disconfirming feedback, confirming feedback inflated participants' reports 
more strongly than in the cognitive load condition (M = 7.12, SD = 1.55 and M = 3.94. SD = 1.92, d 
= 1.42, respectively), t(8. 414) = 7.44, g < .01. d = 1.42. 
Participants ' reports of negative comments. In the no time pressure condition, the Feedback x 
Cognitive Load interaction was not significant for participants' reports of the extent to which they 
noticed negative comments from the person who had the affair. t(8,407) = 1.38, g = .17. In the time 
pressure condition, the magnitude of the feedback effect was smaller in the cognitive load condition 
than in the no cognitive load condition, interaction t(8, 407) = 2.16, g = .03. In the cognitive load 
condition, the feedback variable did not affect participants' reports of the extent to which they noticed 
negative comments from the person who had the affair, t(8,407) = 0.83, g = .41, d = 0.15. However, 
in the no cognitive load condition, participants who heard confirming feedback reported noticing 
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Time Pressure: 
Feedback x Cognitive Load interaction 
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Figure 2. Feedback x Time Pressure x Cognitive Load interaction on participants' reports of the basis 
they had for their decision 
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Figure 3. Feedback x Time Pressure x Cognitive Load interaction on participants' recollection of 
negative comments from the member of the couple who had the affair 
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Figure 4. Feedback x Time Pressure x Cognitive Load interaction on participants' reports of the 
extent to which they were suspicious that one member of the couple had an affair 
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more negative comments from the person who had the affair than did those who heard disconfirming 
feedback (M = 7.88, SD = 1.56 and M = 6.12, SD = 2.48, respectively), t(8, 407) = 3.26, g < .01, d = 
0.80. 
Participants ' reports of suspicion. In the time pressure condition, the Feedback x Cognitive 
Load interaction was not significant, t(8,414) = 1.32, g = .19. In the no time pressure condition, the 
magnitude of the feedback effect was smaller in the no cognitive load condition than in the cognitive 
load condition, interaction t(8,414) = 1.97, g < .05. In the no cognitive load condition, the feedback 
variable did not affect participants' reports of suspicion, t(8,414) = 0.40, g = .69, d = 0.07. However, 
in the cognitive load condition, those who heard confirming feedback reported being more suspicious 
than did those who heard disconfirming feedback (M = 3.58, SD = 2.87 and M = 2.19. SD = 2.31, 
respectively), t(8, 414) = 2.11, g = .04. d = 0.52. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 tested two competing hypotheses for the post-decision feedback effect: 
anchoring and adjustment versus biased search of memory. The anchoring and adjustment hypothesis 
was based on the notion that arbitrary starting points (i.e., "anchors") can bias subsequent judgments 
(e.g.. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In the post-decision feedback paradigm, the anchor is the set of 
feelings created by post-decision feedback (e.g., "Now, I'm positive that my decision was correct."). 
The anchor biases subsequent judgments because participants fail to sufficiently adjust from the 
anchor when answering the dependent measures. It was hypothesized that the anchoring and 
adjustment hypothesis was supported if resource constraint manipulations caused an increase in the 
magnitude of the post-decision feedback effect. The biased search of memory hypothesis proposed 
that participants answer the dependent measures by searching for memories that are consistent with 
the feedback that they have received. It was hypothesized that the biased search of memory 
hypothesis would be supported if resource constraint manipulations caused a decrease in the 
magnitude of the post-decision feedback effect. 
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In order to test these hypotheses, three variables were manipulated in Experiment 3: post-
decision feedback, time pressure, and cognitive load. The typical post-decision feedback effect 
replicated; confirming feedback inflated a broad range of participants' reports, including reports of 
certainty, the ease with which the decision was made, ability to detect variations in tone of voice, and 
the degree to which participants reported being suspicious that one member of the couple had an 
affair. Therefore, it was possible to test the anchoring and adjustment versus biased search of 
memory hypotheses. The effect of the resource constraint manipulations on the post-decision 
feedback effect was examined through the patterns of the three-way Feedback x Time Pressure x 
Cognitive Load interactions. 
There were only three significant three-way interactions. The pattern of the three-way 
interactions on two dependent measures, participants' reports of the basis they had for their decision 
and the extent to which they recalled negative comments from either member of the couple, was 
consistent with the biased search of memory hypothesis because the resource constraint 
manipulations decreased the magnitude of the feedback effect. The third interaction, on participants' 
reports of the extent to which they were suspicious that one member of the couple might have had an 
affair, was consistent with the anchoring and adjustment hypothesis because the resource constraint 
manipulations increased the magnitude of the feedback effect. 
There are three reasons why this pattern of data does not support either the anchoring and 
adjustment hypothesis or the biased search of memory hypothesis. First, only three out of 16 possible 
interactions were significant. Second, the three-way interaction was not significant on the certainty 
dependent measure. As noted in Experiment 2, certainty is arguably the most important measure 
because participants' certainty reports form the basis of evaluations of accuracy (Bless & Strack. 
1998). Third, the significant interactions supported different hypotheses. Two supported the biased 
search of memory whereas the third supported the anchoring and adjustment hypothesis. 
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To the extent that the resource constraint manipulations were successful, the results indicate 
that the post-decision feedback effect is not affected when participants' cognitive resources are taxed. 
What evidence is there to suggest that the resource constraint manipulations were successful? First, 
previous research supports the use of cognitive load manipulations (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krall, 
1988). Second, there were five main effects of the time pressure manipulation, suggesting that this 
manipulation was successful in affecting participants' responses to the dependent measures. 
If the resource constraint manipulations were successful, this experiment demonstrates that 
the post-decision feedback effect is a robust phenomenon. Specifically, it is a phenomenon that is 
more automatic than previously thought. Recall that each of the alternative hypotheses in Experiment 
3 assumed that there was an effortful component of participants' responses to the dependent 
measures. According to the anchoring and adjustment hypothesis, making an adjustment from the 
anchor of current feelings is effortful. According to the biased search of memory hypothesis, 
searching memory for feedback-consistent recollections is an effortful process. The fact that neither 
hypothesis received empirical support suggests that the post-decision feedback effect is a rapid, 
effortless phenomenon. This finding requires some re-thinking of the assumed processes underlying 
the post-decision feedback effect. 
One possibility is that the feedback effect operates like an anchor (which is automatically 
established when feedback is administered) from which there is no adjustment (hence, no effort). For 
example, participants might simply use their current feelings (e.g., "I was correct.") from which to 
make assumptions about internal states (e.g., certainty) without any attempt to adjust for how the 
feedback might have influenced current feelings. Anchoring without adjustment has not been 
previously discussed in the literature. Under what conditions is it likely to occur? There are two 
factors that ought to make people adjust from an anchor. First, if there is a pre-feedback memory or 
knowledge trace, the need for adjustment should be apparent to the participant. It makes sense that 
anchors have less impact (i.e., there is more adjustment from the anchor) when participants know 
62 
more about the subject matter. For example, an anchor of 100 million will have less impact on 
Americans' estimates of the population of the U.S. than it will on Americans' estimates of the 
population of Indonesia (for which there might not be a knowledge trace). The apparent absence of 
adjustment in the post-decision feedback paradigm suggests that participants had no knowledge or 
memory for their pre-anchor (i.e., pre-feedback) views on these questions. 
Second, even without pre-feedback knowledge, we might expect some adjustment from the 
anchor of post-decision feedback if participants were aware that the feedback might have influenced 
them (i.e., "I don't know how certain I was at the time, but the feedback probably influenced me so 
I'll assume that I wasn't as certain as I am now."). The failure of resource constraint manipulations to 
interfere with adjustments suggests that no adjustments to the feedback anchor were made. 
Therefore, it appears that participants had neither a memory trace for their pre-feedback thoughts nor 
an appreciation for the need to take the influence of the feedback into account. If there is no pre-
feedback memory trace, the failure to find support for the biased search of memory hypothesis is not 
surprising. Recall that the biased search of memory hypothesis proposed that participants collected a 
biased set of feedback-consistent recollections from which they answered the dependent measures 
questionnaire. If there are no pre-feedback memory traces, a search process cannot provide 
participants with answers for the dependent measures questionnaire. Future research should examine 
what happens if deliberation is introduced in the post-decision feedback paradigm (i.e., participants 
are instructed to think hard about their responses before answering the dependent measures 
questionnaire). 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Three experiments investigated a phenomenon of memory distortion in which social 
influence causes dramatic changes in recollections of a decision-making experience. Participants 
made a decision about which member of a couple had an affair and then received bogus feedback 
about the accuracy of their decision. Experiment 1 demonstrated that people's recollections are 
distorted in three categories: elements of the decision (e.g., how certain people recalled being at the 
time of the decision), elements of the video (e.g., the extent to which participants had a good basis for 
their decision), and elements of general abilities (e.g., how good people reported being at making 
judgments about others, in general). The set of results obtained in Experiment 1 was labeled the post-
decision feedback effect. 
One explanation for the post-decision feedback effect was that participants answered the 
dependent measures in such a way as to ensure that they appeared to be good decision makers. 
Experiment 2 was designed to test this possibility. Half of the participants in Experiment 2 had 
advance knowledge of several dependent measures. The remaining participants did not see any of the 
dependent measures before completing the questionnaire (i.e., the question-knowledge manipulation). 
If participants were answering the dependent measures questionnaire with a self-presentation goal in 
mind, the question-knowledge manipulation should have had no effect on the strength of the post-
decision feedback effect. However, this manipulation reduced the magnitude of the post-decision 
feedback effect. Therefore, it was concluded that self-presentation is not an adequate explanation for 
the post-decision feedback effect. Two additional hypotheses were introduced and tested in 
Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3 tested two competing hypotheses for the post-decision feedback effect: 
anchoring and adjustment versus biased search of memory. There were only three significant three-
way interactions on participants' reports of basis, negative, and suspicion, indicating that neither 
hypothesis was empirically supported. These results suggest that participants are basing their 
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responses on their current feelings without engaging in either the effortful adjustment process or the 
effortful search of memory. Participants' reports are distorted because the post-decision feedback 
manipulation provides a different set of current feelings or beliefs for participants in the 
disconfirming versus confirming feedback conditions. 
This conclusion is consistent with the results of Experiment 2 indicating that the post-
decision feedback effect is moderated by the question-knowledge manipulation in which participants 
see some dependent measures before hearing feedback. Those results were interpreted as 
demonstrating that participants do not consider their experience until confronted with the dependent 
measures questionnaire. As Experiment 3 demonstrates, participants automatically incorporate post-
decision feedback into their responses when they are confronted with the dependent measures 
questionnaire. 
Throughout all three experiments, the main effect of the feedback variable was consistently 
strong. Confirming feedback reliably inflated participants' reports in three categories: elements of the 
video (e.g., the extent to which negative comments could be recalled), elements of the decision 
process (e.g., the ease with which the decision was made), and elements of general abilities (e.g., 
reported general abilities to make judgments about others). It is important to remember that this 
pattern of distorted recollections was produced by a simple, casual comment from the experimenter. 
The fact that this research concentrates on how social influence distorts recollections represents a 
significant extension of extant literature. Current research on social influence does not examine the 
effect of social influence variables on reports of prior experiences. 
There are many ways in which future research can clarify the characteristics of this important 
phenomenon of memory distortion. For example, are there additional manipulations, besides the 
question-knowledge manipulation from Experiment 2. that will moderate the post-decision feedback 
effect? Previous research indicates that individual difference variables (e.g., scores on the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale) affect the degree to which people's memories are distorted by 
65 
hypnosis (Porter et al., 2000); do individual difference variables affect susceptibility to the post-
decision feedback effect? Also, in general, people are not very good at avoiding the trap of memory 
illusions (e.g., Roediger & Mc Dermott, 2000). Does that pattern hold in the post-decision feedback 
paradigm? Is there a way to train participants to avoid being influenced by post-decision feedback? 
Research indicates that adopting a "consider-the-opposite" strategy is an effective way to prevent 
anchoring biases (Mussweiler, S track, & Pfeiffer, 2000); would that strategy eliminate the effect of 
post-decision feedback? In addition, it is possible that the number of alternatives from which 
participants choose could affect the magnitude of the feedback effect. For example, consider an 
experiment in which participants' task is to choose which one of four couples had an affair. By 
increasing the number of alternatives, the amount of uncertainty in the task also increases. Perhaps 
this additional uncertainty would enhance the effect of confirming feedback but diminish the effect of 
disconfirming feedback. Further research will clarify how modifications to the post-decision 
feedback paradigm influence the magnitude of the feedback effect. 
The post-decision feedback paradigm evolved out of research on eyewitness identifications. 
In that context, memory distortions are undeniably harmful; accurate recollections are imperative 
when evaluating the accuracy of an eyewitness. Therefore, the post-decision feedback effect has been 
described as a similarly harmful phenomenon. However, it is possible that the distortions observed in 
the post-decision feedback paradigm serve an adaptive function. Perhaps people benefit from 
memory distortions by using them as a means to justify a decision to themselves. To the extent that 
people are motivated to form a coherent image of themselves (e.g., Baumeister, 1998), perhaps 
recollections of a decision must be distorted to fit easily with an existing self-schema. Perhaps 
distorted recollections serve a self-esteem maintenance function; could failure to incorporate distorted 
recollections into a coherent self-schema have implications for mental well-being? Future research 
will clarify the cognitive antecedents and intrapersonal ramifications of the post-decision feedback 
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effect. In the meantime, for the families of Argentina's "disappeared," distorted recollections might 
be the best means of coping with personal tragedy. 
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APPENDIX A 
DEPENDENT MEASURES: EYEWITNESS PARADIGM 
The following questions refer to the video you watched. In answering these questions, try to recall, as 
best you can, the sequence of events you saw on the video. For the questions that have a scale, circle 
the number that best represents your belief. 
At the time you identified the person from the video lineup, how certain were you that the person 
you identified from the video lineup was the person you saw in the video? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
not at all totally 
certain certain 
How good of a view did you get of the person in the video? 
0  1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
very poor very good 
How well were you able to make out specific features of the person's face from the video? 
0  1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
not at all very well 
How much attention were you paying to the face of the person in the video while viewing the tape? 
0  1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
none my total 
attention 
To what extent do you feel that you had a good basis (enough information) to make an identification? 
0  1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
no basis a very good 
at all good basis 
This space for experimenter use only: 
Date Time Cubicle M or F 
Feed Exp A first (H) B first (T) 
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How easy or difficult was it for you to figure out which person in the video lineup was the person 
from the video? 
0  1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
extremely extremely 
difficult easy 
From the time the video lineup started, how long do you estimate it took you to make an 
identification? 
0  1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
1 needed I had to think 
almost no time about the video lineup 
to identify someone for a lonp time 
to identify someone 
On the basis of your memory of the person from the video, how willing would you have been to 
testify in court that the person you identified was the same person you saw in the video? 
0  1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
not at all totally 
willing willing 
Generally, how good is your recognition memory for the faces of strangers you have encountered on 
only one prior occasion? 
0  1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
very poor excellent 
How clear is the image you have in your memory of the person you saw in the video? 
0  1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
not at all very clear 
clear 
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Indicate the extent to which the following statements describe the decision process you used in 
making your identification from the video lineup: 
1 just recognized him, I cannot explain why. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This statement 
does not describe 
mv decision process 
at all 
His face just "popped out" at me. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This statement 
does not describe 
mv decision process 
at all 
1 compared the people to each other in order to narrow the choices. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This statement 
does not describe 
mv decision process 
at all 
1 first eliminated the ones definitely not him, then chose among the rest. 
0 1 2 
This statement 
does not describe 
mv decision process 
at all 
3 8 
10 
This statement 
describes mv 
decision process 
extremely well 
10 
This statement 
describes mv 
decision process 
extremely well 
10 
This statement 
describes mv 
decision process 
extremely well 
10 
This statement 
describes mv 
decision process 
extremely well 
He was the closest person to what I remember, but not exact. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This statement 
does not describe 
mv decision process 
at all 
10 
This statement 
describes mv 
decision process 
extremely well 
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I matched the image in my head to the person on the video. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This statement 
does not describe 
mv decision process 
at all 
10 
This statement 
describes mv 
decision process 
extremely well 
I based the judgment on specific facial features (e.g., nose, hair, eyes). 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
This statement 
does not describe 
mv decision process 
at all 
10 
This statement 
describes mv 
decision process 
extremely well 
Indicate the extent to which the following statement describes your thoughts: 
"While I was viewing the person on the videotape, I had a suspicion that I might have to identify that 
person later." 
0 1 2 
This statement 
does not describe 
mv thoughts 
at all 
10 
This statement 
describes mv 
thoughts 
extremely well 
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APPENDIX B 
DEPENDENT MEASURES: SUICIDE SCENARIO 
The following questions refer to the interaction you watched on the video. In answering 
these questions, try to recall, as best you can, what you saw on the video. Circle the number 
that best represents your belief. 
At the time you decided which person committed suicide, how certain were you that you chose 
the correct person? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
not at all totally 
certain certain 
How much attention were you paying to the conversation the two people in the video were having? 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
none my total 
attention 
At the time you decided which person committed suicide, to what extent did you feel that you had 
a good basis (enough information) to make your decision? 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
no basis a very 
at all good basis 
At the time you watched the video, how depressed did you think the person who did not commit 
suicide was? 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
not at all totally 
depressed depressed 
At the time you watched the video, how depressed did you think the person who did commit suicide 
was? 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
not at all totally 
depressed depressed 
This space for experimenter use only: 
Date Time Cubicle M or F 
Feed Exp A first (H) B first (T) 
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How easy or difficult was it for you to decide which person committed suicide? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
extremely 
easy 
How long did it take you to decide which person committed suicide? 
0 1 2  3 4  5  6 7  8  
It took almost 
no time 
In general, how good are you at making judgments about other people? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
very poor 
In general, how good are you at interpreting non-verbal behaviors? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
very poor 
Which statement describes your decision process? Choose one. 
a) As soon as the experimenter told me that one of the people committed suicide, I knew 
exactly who it was. 
b) I had to think back about the conversation and reconstruct it before I could decide 
which person committed suicide. 
Indicate the extent to which the following statement describes your thoughts: 
"While I was watching the people's conversation on the videotape, I had a suspicion that one of the 
people might have committed suicide." 
9 10 
extremely 
difficult 
9 10 
It took a 
long time 
9 10 
excellent 
9 10 
excellent 
0 1 2 
This statement does 
not describe mv 
thoughts at all 
3 8 9 10 
This statement 
describes mv 
thoughts 
extremely well 
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APPENDIX C 
EXPERIMENT 1: DEBRIEFING 
Thank you for your participation today. At this point, I'd like to describe the purpose of our 
study in more detail and then answer any questions you might have about your participation. 
Previous research has shown that information people hear after making a decision can change their 
answers to certain questions. For example, research conducted in this lab has shown that people who 
are given information suggesting that they made a correct identification of a criminal suspect from a 
police lineup inflate their answers to certain questions compared to people who do not hear 
information suggesting that their identification was correct. Specifically, people who heard that their 
identification was correct reported that they were more certain in the accuracy of their identification, 
had a better view of the culprit, and paid more attention to the culprit than did people who did not 
hear such information. 
In this study, we are interested in whether the same pattern of results applies to different 
situations: are people's answers to certain questions changed by the kind of information they hear 
about the accuracy of their decision? In order to test this idea, people in this experiment watched a 
video of people interacting, made a judgment about the interaction, and heard information about the 
accuracy of their judgment. After watching the video, participants were told that one of the people 
committed suicide or had an affair and they were asked to determine which one it was. After making 
their judgment, we gave people one of two types of information about the accuracy of their decision. 
Some people heard that they were correct, and others heard that they were incorrect. So there were 
two independent, or manipulated, variables in this study: what you were told about the people you 
watched on the video and the type of information you received after making your judgment. Our 
dependent, or measured, variables were your answers to the questions about the video. 
In order to test the idea that information about accuracy determines how you answered 
questions about the video, we needed to make sure that no one was actually accurate. Therefore, we 
constructed the videotape with actors who were behaving according to a script. No one actually 
committed suicide and no one actually had an affair. The tape was created for our use in this 
experiment only. You should know that the fact that you made a judgment about one of the people 
committing suicide (or having an affair) when neither event occurred does not mean that your 
interpersonal observational skills are worse that you thought. It simply means that you did what you 
were asked to do in the experiment. 
If you feel upset or anxious as a result of your participation, I will be available to talk with 
you individually and privately. In addition, you are encouraged to explore your feelings with a 
counselor at the Student Counseling Service on campus, if you are upset by this experiment. 
Confidential counseling services are available, free of charge, to all university students at the Student 
Counseling Service, Third floor, Student Services Building. Appointments can be arranged by calling 
294-5056 or by going to the reception desk at the Counseling Service. 
Through research like this, we hope to develop a greater understanding of how information 
about accuracy affects people's recollections of their experiences and their decision process. 
Learning about how people recall experiences leading up to decisions that they have made is an 
important part of understanding decision processes in general. Understanding people's decision 
processes can be helpful in understanding behavior in a variety of situations: jurors evaluating 
witnesses, teachers evaluating students, or children interpreting their parents, for example. 
Because it was important that you did not know what kind of judgment you were going to be 
asked to make, if you know anyone participating in the study, please do not tell them about the 
experiment in detail. That way, we can keep the experiment the same for everyone. Do you 
understand? If you have any questions, you can ask me now or contact the principal investigator, Dr. 
Gary Wells. Thanks again for your participation. 
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APPENDIX D 
EXPERIMENT 2: QUESTION-KNOWLEDGE MANIPULATION SHEET 
At this time, we'd like you to think privately about the couple you saw on the video and the 
decision you made about their relationship. Specifically, think about the following questions 
and how you might answer them. DO NOT ACTUALLY MARX AN ANSWER TO ANY 
QUESTION. After you have some time to think about how you might answer these 
questions, I'll be back with a questionnaire that includes these questions as well as several 
others. 
At the time you decided which person had an affair, how certain were you that you chose the 
correct person? 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
not at all totally 
certain certain 
At the time you decided which person had an affair, to what extent did you feel that you had a good 
basis (enough information) to make your decision? 
0 
no basis 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
a very 
good basis 
How easy or difficult was it for you to decide which person had an affair? 
0 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
extremely 
difficult 
extremely 
easy 
How long did it take you to decide which person had an affair? 
0 1 
It took almost 
no time 
2  3  4 5 6 7  8 9  1 0  
It took a 
long time 
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APPENDIX F 
EXPERIMENT 2: DEBRIEFING 
Thank you for your participation today. At this point, I'd like to describe the purpose of our 
study in more detail and then answer any questions you might have about your participation. 
Previous research has shown that information people hear after making a decision can change their 
answers to certain questions. For example, research conducted in this lab has shown that people who 
are given information suggesting that they made a correct identification of a criminal suspect from a 
police lineup inflate their answers to certain questions compared to people who do not hear 
information suggesting that their identification was correct. Specifically, people who heard that their 
identification was correct reported that they were more certain in the accuracy of their identification, 
had a better view of the culprit, and paid more attention to the culprit than did people who did not 
hear such information. However, we also find that people who are instructed to think about what they 
saw are not as influenced by feedback information as are people who are not given instructions to 
think about what they saw. 
In this study, we are interested in whether the same pattern of results applies to different 
situations: are people's answers to certain questions changed by the kind of information they hear 
about the accuracy of their decision? Are people still influenced by feedback information even if they 
are instructed to think about what they saw? In order to test these ideas, people in this experiment 
watched a video of people interacting, made a judgment about the interaction, and heard information 
about the accuracy of their judgment. After watching the video, participants were told that one of the 
people had an affair and they were asked to determine which one it was. After making their 
judgment, we gave people one of two types of information about the accuracy of their decision. 
Some people heard that they were correct, others heard that they were incorrect. Still others got no 
information about the accuracy of their judgment. In addition, some people were instructed to think 
about what they saw on the video and others weren't. So there were two independent, or 
manipulated, variables in this study: the type of information you received after making your judgment 
and whether we asked you to think about the video before answering questions about what you saw. 
Our dependent, or measured, variables were your answers to the questions about the video. 
In order to test the idea that information about accuracy determines how you answered 
questions about the video, we needed to make sure that no one was actually accurate. Therefore, we 
constructed the videotape with actors who were behaving according to a script. Therefore, no one 
actually had an affair. The tape was created for our use in this experiment only. You should know 
that the fact that you made a judgment about one of the people having an affair when that event did 
not actually happen does not mean that your interpersonal observational skills are worse that you 
thought. It simply means that you did what you were asked to do in the experiment. 
If you feel upset or anxious as a result of your participation, I will be available to talk with 
you individually and privately. In addition, you are encouraged to explore your feelings with a 
counselor at the Student Counseling Service on campus, if you are upset by this experiment. 
Confidential counseling services are available, free of charge, to all university students at the Student 
Counseling Service, Third floor, Student Services Building. Appointments can be arranged by calling 
294-5056 or by going to the reception desk at the Counseling Service. 
Through research like this, we hope to develop a greater understanding of how information 
about accuracy affects people's recollections of their experiences and their decision process. 
Learning about how people recall experiences leading up to decisions that they have made is an 
important part of understanding decision processes in general. Understanding people's decision 
processes can be helpful in understanding behavior in a variety of situations: jurors evaluating 
witnesses, teachers evaluating students, or children interpreting their parents, for example. 
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Because it was important that you did not know what kind of judgment you were going to be 
asked to make, if you know anyone participating in the study, please do not tell them about the 
experiment in detail. That way, we can keep the experiment the same for everyone. Do you 
understand? If you have any questions, you can ask me now or contact the principal investigator. Dr. 
Gary Wells. Thanks again for your participation. 
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APPENDIX F 
EXPERIMENT 3: RESPONSE SHEET 
The following questions refer to the interaction you watched on the video. In answering these 
questions, try to recall, as best you can, what you saw on the video. Circle the number that best 
represents your belief. 
Question 1 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
not at all totally 
certain certain 
Question 2 
0 1 
none 
Question 3 
9 10 
my total 
attention 
0 1 
no basis 
at all 
10 
a very 
good basis 
Question 4 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
extremely 
easy 
6 7 8 9 10 
extremely 
difficult 
Question 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
It took almost 
no time 
6 7 8 9 10 
It took a 
long time 
Question 6 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
very poor excellent 
This space for experimenter use only: 
Date Time Cubicle M or F 
Feed Exp A first (H) B first (T) 
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Question 7 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
very poor 
6 7 8 9 10 
excellent 
Question 8 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
very poor excellent 
Question 9 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
I didn't I noticed 
notice any intense 
hostility hostility 
Question 10 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
I didn't I noticed 
notice anv intense 
anxiety anxiety 
Question 11 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
I didn't I noticed 
notice intense 
any frustration frustration 
Question 12 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8 9  1 0  
I noticed I didn't 
a lot of notice 
supportive anv supportive 
comments comments 
Question 13 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
I can't recall I can recall 
very many a lot of 
negative comments negative comments 
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Question 14 
1 2 
I can recall 
a lot of 
positive comments 
Question 15 
0 12 3 
It didn't 
affect my 
answers 
to any of the 
questions 
Question 16 
a) As soon as the experimenter told me that one of the people had an affair, I knew exactly who 
it was. 
b) I had to think back about the conversation and reconstruct it before I could decide 
which person had an affair. 
Question 17 
0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7  8  9  1 0  
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I can't recall 
very many 
positive comments 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
It affected 
my answers 
to all of the 
questions 
not describe mv 
thoughts at all thoughts 
extremely well 
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APPENDIX G 
EXPERIMENT 3: DEPENDENT MEASURES KEY 
Practice questions 
A. How big of a city is Ames? 
B. How long is the Mississippi River? 
C. How long have you been a student at Iowa State? 
Buffer/manipulation check questions 
1. How loud was the couple's conversation? 
2. Was the videotape longer or shorter than 20 minutes? 
3. Please estimate how long you think the video actually was. 
Dependent measures 
4. At the time you decided which person had an affair, how certain were you that you chose the 
correct person? 
5. How much attention were you paying to the conversation the two people in the video were 
having? 
6. At the time you decided which person had an affair, to what extent did you feel that you had a 
good basis (enough information) to make your decision? 
7. How easy or difficult was it for you to decide which person had an affair? 
8. How long did it take you to decide which person had an affair? 
9. In general, how good are you at making judgments about other people? 
10. In general, how good are you at interpreting non-verbal behaviors? 
11. In general, how good are you at detecting variations in people's tone of voice? 
12. At the time you were watching the video, to what degree did you notice hostility in the couple's 
conversation? 
13. Did the female member of the couple talk for more or less than 10% of the time? 
14. What percentage of the time did the female member of the couple actually talk? 
15. At the time you were watching the video, to what degree did you notice that the couple was 
anxious? 
16. At the time you were watching the video, to what extent did you notice that either member of the 
couple was frustrated? 
17. To what extent did you notice supportive comments from either member of the couple? 
Preceding Question 18: The experimenter told you which member of the couple had the affair. 
Think about that person for a moment. 
18. To what extent can you recall the person who had the affair making negative comments about the 
relationship or their partner? 
19. To what extent can you recall the person who had the affair making positive comments about the 
relationship or their partner? 
20. To what extent do you think the information you received about the accuracy of your judgment 
affected your answers to any of the questions you have just answered? 
21. Which statement describes your decision process? 
22. Indicate the extent to which the following statement describes your thoughts: "While I was 
watching the couple's conversation, I had a suspicion that one of them might have had an affair." 
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APPENDIX H 
EXPERIMENT 3: DEBRIEFING 
Thank you for your participation today. At this point, I'd like to describe the purpose of our 
study in more detail and then answer any questions you might have about your participation. 
Previous research has shown that information people hear after making a decision can change their 
answers to certain questions. For example, research conducted in this lab has shown that people who 
are given information suggesting that they made a correct identification of a criminal suspect from a 
police lineup inflate their answers to certain questions compared to people who do not hear 
information suggesting that their identification was correct. Specifically, people who heard that their 
identification was correct reported that they were more certain in the accuracy of their identification, 
had a better view of the culprit, and paid more attention to the culprit than did people who did not 
hear such information. 
In this study, we are interested in whether the same pattern of results applies to different 
situations: are people's answers to certain questions changed by the kind of information they hear 
about the accuracy of their decision? Are people still influenced by feedback information even if they 
are instructed to think about what they saw? In order to test these ideas, people in this experiment 
watched a video of people interacting, made a judgment about the interaction, and heard information 
about the accuracy of their judgment. After watching the video, participants were told that one of the 
people had an affair and they were asked to determine which one it was. After making their 
judgment, we gave people one of two types of information about the accuracy of their decision. 
Some people heard that they were correct, others heard that they were incorrect. People then 
answered questions about their decision process and the video they watched. We were also interested 
in how people would answer the questions if they were under time pressure or were thinking about 
something else. So some people had a limited amount of time to answer each question on the video 
screen. Others thought that there was going to be a test to determine how many questions they could 
remember from the questionnaire. A final group of people answered the questionnaire without time 
pressure or instructions to remember the questions. So there were two independent, or manipulated, 
variables in this study: the type of information you received after making your judgment and the 
condition in which you answered the questionnaire. Our dependent, or measured, variables were your 
answers to the questions about the video. 
In order to test the idea that information about accuracy determines how you answered 
questions about the video, we needed to make sure that no one was actually accurate. Therefore, we 
constructed the videotape with actors who were behaving according to a script. Therefore, no one 
actually had an affair. The tape was created for our use in this experiment only. You should know 
that the fact that you made a judgment about one of the people having an affair when that event did 
not actually happen does not mean that your interpersonal observational skills are worse that you 
thought. It simply means that you did what you were asked to do in the experiment. 
If you feel upset or anxious as a result of your participation, I will be available to talk with 
you individually and privately. In addition, you are encouraged to explore your feelings with a 
counselor at the Student Counseling Service on campus, if you are upset by this experiment. 
Confidential counseling services are available, free of charge, to all university students at the Student 
Counseling Service, Third floor. Student Services Building. Appointments can be arranged by calling 
294-5056 or by going to the reception desk at the Counseling Service. 
Through research like this, we hope to develop a greater understanding of how information 
about accuracy affects people's recollections of their experiences and their decision process. 
Learning about how people recall experiences leading up to decisions that they have made is an 
important part of understanding decision processes in general. Understanding people's decision 
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processes can be helpful in understanding behavior in a variety of situations: jurors evaluating 
witnesses, teachers evaluating students, or children interpreting their parents, for example. 
Because it was important that you did not know what kind of judgment you were going to be 
asked to make, if you know anyone participating in the study, please do not tell them about the 
experiment in detail. That way, we can keep the experiment the same for everyone. Do you 
understand? If you have any questions, you can ask me now or contact the principal investigator, Dr. 
Gary Wells. Thanks again for your participation. 
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